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ENFORCEMENT OF TRIBAL COURT TAX JUDGMENTS
OUTSIDE OF INDIAN COUNTRY:
THE WAYS AND MEANS
SCOTT A. TAYLOR*
Full faith and credit for tribal court judgments in state courts and the reverse
situation, state court judgments enforced through tribal courts, have received
substantial scholarly attention, much of which I discuss in part I of this article. No
commentators, however, have looked at the full faith and credit question from the
point of view of enforcing tax liabilities. A substantial number of tribes have tax
systems' and collection of unpaid tribal taxes may force tribal tax officials to seek
taxpayer assets located off the reservation. Likewise, states have a history of
aggressively asserting their taxes against tribes and their members.2 Especially in
the case of gaming tribes, states may look to per capita payments as a source to
satisfy unpaid state taxes. 3 Given these realities, state courts will have to consider
the enforceability of tribal tax liabilities, and tribal courts will certainly have to
decide whether they will assist state tax authorities in their efforts to collect unpaid
state taxes owed by tribal members having substantial on-reservation assets. Federal
courts may also be involved because tribes are likely to have better luck on
jurisdictional questions in the federal forum.
In this article, we (you, the reader, and I, the author) retrace some of the territory
explored by others. We do so, however, from a tax collection perspective. In part
II, we look generally at the history of comity and full faith and credit in the United
States. In part III, we review the law as applied to Indian tribes with some new
interpretations of the existing statutory framework, leading me to agree with what
Fred L. Ragsdale concluded almost four decades ago: the federal full faith and
credit statute does not apply to tribes.' Since then, Congress has enacted several
* Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minneapolis; Commissioner, Navajo Tax
Commission, Navajo Nation; Justice, Court of Appeals, Prairie Island Indian Community, Minnesota.
1. See, e.g., Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905) (validating a tribal permit tax imposed for
the privilege of doing business on the Creek Nation and finding that the power to tax was one of "the inherent and
essential attributes of...sovereignty"); Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980) (finding that
a tribe's cigarette tax was proper because the "power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly
involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested
of it by federal law or necessary implication of their dependent status"); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S.
130, 141 (1982) (confirming the tribe's severance tax on oil and natural gas and concluding that the tribe's
"authority to tax non-Indians who conduct business on the reservation does not simply derive
from the Tribe's
power to exclude such persons, but is an inherent power necessary to tribal self-government and territorial
management"); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985) (validating the Navajo Nation's
business activity tax and possessory interest tax).
2. See, e.g., The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 wall.) 737 (1867) (holding that Kansas wrongfully attempted
to impose its property tax on tribal lands); The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1867) (holding that New
York wrongfully seized and sold tribal lands for non-payment of property taxes); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (holding that Arizona wrongfully attempted to impose its income tax on earnings
of a Navajo Nation member who lived and worked on the reservation); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976)
(holding that a county within Minnesota wrongfully attempted to impose its property tax on a mobile home located
on the Leech Lake Reservation in Minnesota).
3. See Jefferson v. Comm'r of Revenue, 631 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. 2001) (Minnesota income tax imposed
on the per capita income earned by members of the Prairie Island Indian Community; collection of tax was not at
issue, but source of income came from the tribe and would provide source for collection of the tax).
4. Fred L. Ragsdale, Jr., Problems in the Application of FullFaith and Creditfor Indian Tribes, 7 N.M.
L. REV. 133, 141 (1977) ("IThe legal arguments available for urging the extension of full faith and credit to Indian
tribes are inadequate.").
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narrow full faith and credit provisions for states and tribes.5 None of these statutes
applies to state or federal tax liabilities. We also learn that some states have their
own full faith and credit statutes 6 and that these rules could enable tribal tax
authorities to receive off-reservation enforcement of tax liabilities.
In part IV, we look at off-reservation enforcement of tribal court tax judgments.
Without a federal rule mandating full faith and credit and with most states not
extending general full faith and credit to tribes as a matter of state law, one
possibility is that the Uniform Foreign Money Recognition of Judgments Act might
provide a state law basis for enforcing tribal court tax judgments. This turns out to
be unlikely. Another possibility is comity7 -a common law rule that permits, but
does not require, a state court to recognize a foreign court judgment. The bad news
continues, unfortunately. A common law doctrine known as the "revenue rule"
provides that comity does not extend to tax liabilities. Does this mean that tribal tax
officials should just give up? Maybe yes, maybe no.
Federal courts have begun to develop what they call a federal common law of
comity. This developing area of law might provide a basis for actually getting offreservation enforcement of tribal court taxjudgments. And finally, tribes and states,
because they may have a common interest in promoting cross-border enforcement
of tax liabilities, could enter into inter-governmental agreements. So, let us begin.
I. OVERVIEW OF SCHOLARLY COMMENTARY
Fred L. Ragsdale, Jr.,8 was one of the early academics to give the issue sustained
consideration, and he concluded that no federal law compelled reciprocal full faith
and credit for tribal and state court judgments. 9 Nonetheless, Ragsdale thought that
full faith and credit in this context was a good idea that would validate tribal
1
sovereignty and promote improvement in tribal-state relations. "

5. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (2004) (Violence Against Women Act provision requiring full faith and credit
in tribal/state context for protection orders); 25 U.S.C. § 1725(g) (2004) (a provision in the Maine Indian Claims
Settlement Act requiring full faith and credit amongst the Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Penobscot Tribe, and the State
of Maine for theirjudicial proceedings); 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (d) (2004) (Indian Child Welfare Act provision requiring
full faith and credit in federal and state courts for tribal court child custody determinations made under authority
of the Act); 25 U.S.C. § 2207 (2004) (provision in the Indian Land Consolidation Act requiring the Secretary of
the Interior to give full faith and credit to certain tribal actions affecting descent and distribution of certain Indian
lands); 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (2000) (Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act requiring tribal/state
recognition of child support orders); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) (Defense of Marriage Act provision that
affirmatively relieves states and tribes from recognizing each other's same-sex marriages under any full faith and
credit obligation).
6. See, e.g., WiS. STAT. § 806.245 (2003) (requiring Wisconsin courts to give full faith and credit to tribal
court proceedings if certain requirements are met, including reciprocity).
7. For a codified comity rule, see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § I- 1-25 (Michie 2003) (permitting comity of tribal
court proceedings only if certain conditions are met including, in some instances, reciprocity from the tribe for
South Dakota judicial proceedings).
8. See Ragsdale, supra note 4. My initial exposure to federal Indian law came when Professor Ragsdale,
my torts professor in law school, asked me to be his research assistant and do research on an article he was then
writing that was later published as the piece I have just cited. I express my thanks to him for providing me with this
rich and fruitful exposure to federal Indian law.
9. Id. at 141 (concluding that "the legal arguments available for urging the extension of full faith and credit
to Indian tribes are inadequate").
10. See id. at 141-45.
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Two other academics, Robert Laurence 1 and Robert Clinton,12 have since added
ample scholarly commentary and conducted something of a one-sided debate, with
Laurence 13 as the dominant voice on the issue. Clinton asserts that the federal full
faith and credit statute compels tribal courts to give full faith and credit to state
court judgments.' 4 He contends that this is a good idea because, as Ragsdale earlier
pointed out, it would validate tribal sovereignty and improve tribal-state relations. 5
Laurence, on the other hand, disagrees with Clinton's reading of the federal full
faith and credit statute," which means under the Laurence view that no federal
statute requires full faith and credit. In the absence of a federal mandate, Laurence
recommends that tribal court judgments receive something close to full faith and
credit in state courts 17 and that tribes should develop their own appropriate legal
mechanisms for enforcing state court judgments when such enforcement is
consistent with tribal interests.18 This asymmetrical approach is justified, Laurence
claims, because individual tribes find themselves in circumstances that are very
different from the states.' 9 Tribal sovereignty, he observes, is much more fragile
than state sovereignty. 20 Laurence fears that the imposition of full faith and credit
on tribes could do more harm than good for tribes. 2'
The academic commentary of others has offered additional perspectives. For
example, Stacy Leeds has pointed out that state courts, when required to give tribal
court determinations full faith and credit by operation of special federal statutes,
have developed a very poor track record. 22 The non-compliance of state courts with
federal law shows that the limited applications of full faith and credit in the
11. Robert A. Lefar Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville.
12. Foundation Professor of Law, College of Law, Arizona State University, Tempe.
13. See Robert Laurence, Service of Process and Execution of Judgment on Indian Reservations, 10 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 257 (1982); Robert Laurence, The Enforcement of Judgments Across Indian Reservation
Boundaries:Full Faith and Credit, Comity, and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 OR. L. REV. 589 (1990); Robert
Laurence, Rules of the Game:Sovereignty andthe Native American Nation: The Bothersome Needfor Asymmetry
in Any Federally Dictated Rule of Recognition for the Enforcement of Money Judgments Across Indian
ReservationBoundaries,27 CoNN. L. REV. 979 (1995); Robert Laurence, The Off-Reservation Garnishmentof an
On-Reservation Debt andRelated Issues in the Cross-BoundaryEnforcement of Money Judgments, 22 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 355 (1998) [hereinafter Laurence, Off-Reservation Garnishment];Robert Laurence, Full Faithand Credit
in TribalCourts:An Essay on TribalSovereignty, Cross-BoundaryReciprocity and the Unlikely Case ofEberhard
v. Eberhard, 28 N.M. L. REV. 19 (1998); Robert Laurence, Native American Sovereignty Issues: The Role, IfAny,
for the Federal Courts in the Cross-Boundary Enforcement of Federal,State and Tribal Money Judgments, 35
TULSA L.J. 1 (1999); Robert Laurence, Symmetry and Asymmetry in FederalIndian Law, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 861
(2000) (dealing less with full faith and credit but building off insights learned from his work in that area); see also
P.S. Deloria & Robert Laurence, Negotiating Tribal-StateFullFaithand CreditAgreements: The Topology of the
Negotiation and the Merits of the Question, 28 GA. L. REV. 365 (1994).
14. See Robert N. Clinton, TribalCourtsand the FederalUnion, 26 WILLAMErrEL. REV. 841,901 (1990).
15. See id. at 906-07.
16. See Richard E. Ransom et al., Recognizing and Enforcing State and Tribal Judgments: A Roundtable
Discussion of Law, Policy, and Practice, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 239, 241-47 (1993).
17. See Robert Laurence, The Convergenceof Cross-BoundaryEnforcement Theoriesin American Indian
Law: An Attempt to Reconcile Full Faithand Credit, Comity andAsymmetry, 18 QuINNIPIAcL. REV. 115, 145-47
(1998).
18. See id. at 146-48 (describing how some tribes may desire to follow a peace-making model of justice
that a full faith and credit requirement could undermine).
19. See id. at 143-44.
20. See id. at 118, 144.
21. See id.
22. See Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-JurisdictionalRecognitionand Enforcement of Judgments: A Tribal Court
Perspective,76 N.D. L. REV. 311, 349-50 (2000).
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tribal/state context have not been successes in validating tribal sovereignty or
improving tribal state relations. B.J. Jones explains that justice requires some
mechanism by which tribal court judgments receive recognition in state courts and
suggests that tribes and states should get together to develop some workable
models.23
24
Daina B. Garonzik, like B.J. Jones, sees a need for reciprocal enforcement.
Garonzik's proposal, however, is a federal solution in which she recommends an
amendment to the federal full faith and credit statute.25 To insure uniformity, her
proposed rule would give state recognition to tribal court judgments only if the
particular tribe's court system had been certified by the Bureau of Indian Affairs as
meeting minimum constitutional standards. 26 Carl H. Johnson27 and David S. Clark28
agree with Garonzik and contend that reciprocal full faith and credit is a necessary
ingredient in the tribal/state/federal legal system that we have. Barbara Ann
Atwood, in the limited context of child custody matters, explores the harms that
may result from an unthinking imposition of standard full faith and credit.29 She
sees a substantial risk that a full faith and credit rule will force tribal courts to
compromise the quality ofjustice they achieve by applying their traditional methods
of finding and doing justice.3 °
Overall, this body of scholarly commentary on recognition of tribal court
judgments and orders is impressive. It also shows that we have not yet achieved a
system that provides legal certainty. This article shows that legal certainty is far
from clear in the context of tribal court taxjudgments. Accordingly, it is a good idea
to start at the beginning and review the history of comity and full faith and credit
in the United States.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF COMITY AND FULL FAITH AND
CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES
During the colonial period, the English law on the recognition of foreign
judgments provided that a foreign judgment was prima facie evidence of that which
it purported to determine. 3 This was the rule of comity. There was no full faith and
23. See B.J. Jones, Welcoming TribalCourts into the JudicialFraternity:Emerging Issues in Tribal-State
and Tribal-FederalCourt Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457 (1998).
24. See Daina B. Garonzik, Full Reciprocity for Tribal Courts from a FederalCourts Perspective: A
ProposedAmendment to the Full Faith and CreditAct, 45 EMORY L.J. 723 (1996).
25. See id.
26. See id. at 763-69.
27. See Carl H. Johnson, A Comity of Errors:Why John v. Baker Is Only a Tentative FirstStep in the Right
Direction, 18 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 57 (2001) ("As tribes become increasingly recognized as a third sovereign in our
federalist system, states and Congress are concluding that the most consistent, fair, and respectful mechanism for
recognition of tribal court decisions is through full faith and credit recognition.").
28. See David S. Clark, Part Three: "Traditional"Legal Perspective:State CourtRecognition of Tribal
CourtJudgments: Securing the Blessings of Civilization, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 353, 368 (1998) (stating that
amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 to include tribes "would improve the status of Indian tribes as governmental units
within the legal system of the United States and overall increase their autonomy").
29. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Fighting over Indian Children: The Uses and Abuses of Jurisdictional
Ambiguity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 1051, 1108 (1989).
30. See id. at 1100.
31. See Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understandingof the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the
Defense of MarriageAct, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255, 272-80 (1998) (summarizing the colonial practices prior
to adoption of the Articles of Confederation).
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credit rule. So, for example, a debt determined by a French court and reflected in
a written judgment would be sufficient, absent other evidence, to establish the
liability of one party to another in an English court. 2 The British colonies followed
the English common law on comity.33 More significantly, the colonies accorded
comity to the judgments from other colonies and treated them the same as
judgments from other countries even though the colonies were under the common
dominion of the British monarch.34 Because each of the colonies retained substantial
legislative authority over internal affairs3 5 reflected in laws passed by colonial
legislative bodies, treating a judgment from another colony the same as a foreign
judgment was logical.
At least one group of colonies identified common interests and established what
we can view as the precursor of the full faith and credit clause now embodied in our
Constitution. The commissioners of the United Colonies of New England met in
1644 and recommended that the judicial proceedings of the courts of each colony
be given "due respect."36 Connecticut, in response to the commissioners'
recommendation, enacted a statute providing a procedure for validating sistercolony judicial proceedings.3 a
The full faith and credit clause contained in the Articles of Confederation is
remarkably similar to the text contained in the Constitution and states that "[f]ull
faith and credit shall be given in each of these states to the records, acts and judicial
proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other state." 38 A search of the
legislation enacted by the Continental Congress finds no enabling legislation for
this clause. 39 The absence of enabling legislation is not surprising, however, because
the clause, by its terms, is self-executing. The clause is a command to the states, and
the states, having agreed to the Articles of Confederation, are bound by its
provisions. The Articles of Confederation did not create a national court system. As
a result, the courts of each state were responsible for providing "full faith and
credit" to the judgments of sister states.
Without enabling legislation, the procedural details of how a full faith and credit
system would work are unclear. The sketchy history of the framing of the clause
suggests that some members of the Continental Congress wanted a more specific
clause that would unquestionably establish a procedure by which creditors could
enforce their debts determined in one state in the courts of other states where the
debtor or the debtor's property might be found.' Having opted for a more general
32. See id. at 269.
33. See id. at 272-80.

34. The primary source of law in the colonies was the legislative body of the colony, not the British Crown
or the British Parliament. See, e.g., WILLIAM WALLER HENING, STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA (Vols. 1-9, 1823)

(containing the legislation passed by the various legislative bodies of Virginia from 1617-1778).
35. See, e.g., John J.GibbonsJudicialReview of the Constitution,48 U.PIr.L.REv. 963,969-70 (1987)

(explaining how American colonies viewed their charters as granting substantial legislative autonomy subject to
review by the Privy Council of the Crown).
36. See Whitten, supra note 31, at 274 (quoting 2 EBENEZER HAZARD, HIsTORIcAL COLLECTIONS;
CONSISTING OF STATE PAPERS, AND OTHER AuTHENTIc DocuENTwS; INTENDED AS MATERIALS FOR AN HISTORY OF

THE UNrIED STATES OF AMERICA 13, 21 (T. Dobson 1794)).

37. See id.
38. Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union art. IX., 3 (1781).
39. See generally JOURNALS OFTHECONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789 (1904-37).
40. This is implied by the adoption of a full faith and credit clause to replace notions of comity.
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clause that did not establish precise effect or the procedure to require enforcement,
the Continental Congress was leaving the details to the legislatures and courts of
the individual states.
Any case law during this period is especially valuable in determining what was
the likely understanding of the clause. This understanding is instructive because it
reflects the context in which the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution
was drafted. This context can help us understand the original meaning of the clause.
State courts decided five reported cases under the Articles of Confederation
involving the application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.4' Three of the five
decisions come from Pennsylvania42 and present a confusing picture about the scope
of the clause.43 The other two decisions, one from South Carolina and the other
from Connecticut,4 5 provide straightforward application of full faith and credit
principles. These cases reflect the understanding that the clause was mandatory but
not absolute, suggesting that local courts had leeway in determining standards for
enforcement. The Connecticut case, for example, foretells the modem requirement
that a foreign state judgment is unenforceable if the original court lacked
jurisdiction.46
At this stage, Indian tribes were not necessarily out of the Full Faith and Credit
picture. The 1778 treaty with the Delaware Tribe4 7 contemplated an Indian state in
which the Delaware Tribe would be at the head.48 If the Delaware Tribe, along with
other tribes, had become a state, then the full faith and credit clause in the Articles
of Confederation would have applied and required reciprocal enforcement of
judgments. The states did not finally ratify the Articles until 1781, but they were
complete in 1778 and were undergoing state-by-state approval.4 9 Congress and the

41. See Whitten, supra note 31, at 282-87 (discussing these five cases).
42. James v. Allen, 1 U.S. (Dali.) 188 (Pa. 1786); Millar v. Hall, 1 U.S. (Dali.) 229 (Pa. 1788); Phelps v.
Holker, I U.S. (Dali.) 261 (Pa. 1788).
43. One source of the confusion is Jones v. Allen, 1 U.S. (DalI.) 188 (Pa. 1786), because it involved a
creditor who tried to enforce a New Jersey judgment in Pennsylvania after the New Jersey legislature had
discharged the debtor as bankrupt. The court extended full faith and credit to the judgment but, under a choice of
law approach, declined to honor the effect of the New Jersey bankruptcy, which was then solely a matter of state
law. Id. In Millar v. Hall, I U.S. (Dali.) 229 (Pa. 1788), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court gave effect to the
insolvency of a debtor under Maryland insolvency law. This result is consistent with an obligation to provide full
faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of a sister state. Another source of confusion is found in Phelps v.
Holker, 1 U.S. (DalI.) 261 (Pa. 1788). In Phelps, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that a Massachusetts
judgment rendered in rem through an attachment proceeding was not conclusive and not entitled to full faith and
credit notwithstanding the full faith and credit clause contained in the Articles of Confederation. Id. The court
reasoned that an in rem proceeding ought not be extended beyond the jurisdictional boundaries of the court
rendering the judgment. Id.
44. Jenkins v. Putnam, 1 S.C.L. (I Bay) 8 (1784) (enforcing a North Carolina admiralty court decision
condemning slaves as property of an enemy of the United States and rejecting the original owner's claim of rightful
ownership against the rights of a subsequent purchaser).
45. Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119 (Conn. 1786) (refusing to enforce a Massachusetts judgment where
personal jurisdiction in the original action was not established).
46. Id. at 126 (finding no personal jurisdiction in the original action but acknowledging the obligation to
provide full faith and credit when jurisdiction is proper in the original action).
47. Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union art. IX, 13 (1781).
48. Id. art. IV, 14.
49. See I THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 79-137 (Merrill
Jenson ed., 1976). The Articles of Confederation were drafted in 1776 and 1777 and the states completed
ratification in 1781.
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states were aware of the treaty with the Delaware Tribe" and, presumably,
understood that full faith and credit would be a feature of the relationship. The
Delaware treaty also highlights the point that the tribes were not part of the
confederation and that they lay outside its legal framework unless affirmatively
brought into it.5 Therefore, we can safely conclude that the full faith and credit
clause in the Articles of Confederation had no application to Indian tribes.
The text of the Full Faith and Credit Clause contained in the U.S. Constitution
contains no language that changes its meaning from that found in the Articles of
Confederation. The language from the Constitution is "Full Faith and Credit shall
be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every
other State."52 In the Articles of Confederation, the rule applied to "acts, 53 and in
the Constitution it applies to "public [a]cts."54 Presumably, this part of the Clause
deals with legislation and imposes an obligation in choice of law situations. The
adjective "public" suggests that private acts are not included within the operative
effect of the clause. 5 For our purposes, this is unimportant because we are concerned primarily withjudgments. Our concern is the phrase "judicial proceedings,"
which extends to judgments. In the Articles of Confederation, the reference is to the
"judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates. 56 The Constitution's omission
of the phrase "of the courts and magistrates" does not appear to affect the meaning
in any way. Instead, the drafters appear to merely tighten up the language and seem
to have thought that "judicial proceedings" did not require further elaboration.
Of greater significance is the addition of a second sentence in the Constitution,
which states that "the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof."5 " Under this sentence, Congress has the power to prescribe procedures and
determine the effect of "full faith and credit." This congressional power to prescribe
the effects ofjudgments applies only to interstate judgment recognition because the
text of the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause applies only to states; the
clause does not apply to judgments from tribal courts or to judgments from courts
of foreign nations. Any federal power to determine tribal/state enforcement of
judgments does not derive from this sentence and must be found elsewhere in the
Constitution.
In the context of inter-state recognition of tax judgments of state courts, a
question arose whether these judgments came within the Constitution's clause and
the statute that implemented it. The U.S. Supreme Court answered this question

50. See 12 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 984-86 (1908) (noting the reading

of the treaty to the members of the Continental Congress on October 6, 1778).
51. Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union art. IX, IN 13, 14 (1781) (specifically permitting the
Delaware Nation "to join the present [American] confederation, and to form a state.. .and have representation in
Congress; Provided nothing contained in this article to be considered as conclusive until it meets with the
approbation of Congress").
52. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
53. Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union art. IX, 3 (178 1).
54. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I.
55. See Whitten, supra note 31, at 389.
56. Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union art. IX,

57. U.S. CONST. art V, § 1.

3 (1781).
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affirmatively in Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co.I8 So, if tribes are states within
the meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution or territories
within the meaning of the enabling legislation found in 28 U.S.C. § 1738, then
states would be required to give full faith and credit to a tax judgment of a tribal
court. The next part of this article discusses these definitional questions and
concludes that tribes are not states or territories and that, accordingly, no federal
mandate applies to states in the enforcement of tribal court judgments generally or
to tribal court tax judgments specifically.
III. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT AND TRIBES
There is no evidence that the full faith and credit clause found in the Articles of
Confederation or the Constitution had any application to Native American
governments. The clause's text in both documents applies only to states, and Native
American governments were not states that were members of the confederation or
the federal union. This does not mean that debt collection was not an issue.
Trade in Indian Country was a critical part of the overall British interests in
North America.59 Control of Indian trade was a factor in colonial dissatisfaction
with British rule.' Indian trade was an important part of the American economy
well into the nineteenth century. 6 With ample trade occurring between Europeans
and the indigenous peoples of North America, determination and collection of debts
were no doubt recurring problems. It was a common practice for traders to extend
credit to Indians who often purchased European goods in advance of trading furs
and pelts for the goods.
On the Indian side of the bilateral trade equation, cheating and sharp practices
among traders was common and a substantial source of conflict.62 The better part63
of federal legislation dealing with Native Americans addressed questions of trade.'
This legislation was a continuation, at least in theme, of the regulatory approach
adopted by the British in the middle of the eighteenth century65 and continued by

58. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935) (holding that a county in Wisconsin could
sue to collect on a property tax judgment in Illinois and that such a judgment was entitled to full faith and credit
as a matter of federal law).
59. See Raymond Cross, Sovereign Bargains,Indian Takings, and the Preservationof Indian Country in
the Twenty-First Century, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 425,454 n.167 (1998).
60. See Robert N. Clinton, Rules of the Game: Sovereignty and the Native American Nation: The Dormant
Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055, 1098 (1995).
61. John Jacob Astor, the owner of the American Fur Company founded in 1808 and built around the Indian
fur trade, was the wealthiest man of his day. See Ed Boland, Jr., F.Y.I., N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 19, 2003, § 14, at 2.
62. See Report of Thomas L McKenny on Trading Sites to Secretary of War James Barbour (Feb. 14,
1826), in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 659-60 (1823).

63. Unauthorized and illegal white intrusion on Indian lands was a constant problem for tribes; the federal
government attempted to remedy these intrusions without success. See, e.g., Proclamation of the Continental
Congress (Sept. 22, 1783), at 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 597-602 (1922)
(prohibiting "all persons from making settlements on lands inhabited or claimed by Indians, without the limits or
jurisdiction of any particular State").

64. See, e.g., Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs (Aug. 7, 1786), in 31 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 488-93 (1934) (creating Indian districts with federal supeintendents,
requiring a federal license to trade with Indians, and imposing substantial fines for persons not complying with the

ordinance); Act of July 22, 1790, ch. xxxiii, I Stat. 137-38 (similar to 1786 ordinance and also extending federal
criminal jurisdiction over whites committing crimes in Indian Country).
65.

See Royal Proclamation of 1763, reprinted in CAN. REV. STAT. app. II, no..I (1985).
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the American Congress under the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution.66
Tellingly absent from these rather detailed
67 federal provisions was any kind of
mutual judgment recognition mechanism.
Superimposition of English judicial institutions was not the systemic solution to
debt collection problems or to the fraudulent practices of traders in Indian Country.
Instead, existing legal institutions provided a variety of dispute resolution methods
for individual, intra-tribal, and inter-tribal disputes. For disputes with the British or
colonials, treaties provided some mechanisms for resolving disputes by providing
systemic changes.68 In the late colonial period69 and also in the early American
period,7 ° Indian agents provided an important dispute resolution function. Indian
agents were agents of the federal government 7 and included prominent people who
were supposed to resolve disputes. 72 Given this context, it is accurate to view these
agents as quasi-judicial officials. Their correspondence to the Secretary of War
demonstrates that an important part of their job was to help the trade and treaty
system run smoothly.73
This rather complicated set of legal systems did not translate into judgments from
tribal courts that could be enforced in state courts. And a state court judgment was
not going to do its holder any good if he took it into the jurisdiction of the
Cherokee, Creeks, or the Iroquois Confederation. If anything, cross border dispute
resolution was primarily a function of officials from the colonial, state, confederate,
federal, or British government interacting with relevant leaders of the particular
Native American government. 74 In fact, this government-to-government method of

66. See Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs (Aug. 7, 1786), in 31 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 488-93 (1934) (creating Indian districts with federal superintendents,
requiring a federal license to trade with Indians, and imposing substantial fines for persons not complying with the
ordinance).
67. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 30, 1802, 2 Stat. 139-46 (which contained detailed rules about licensing and
criminal jurisdiction but no provisions relating to the recognition of tribal judicial proceedings).
68. See, e.g., Oglethorpe's FirstTreaty with the Lower Creeks at Savannah, May 21, 1733, in 11 EARLY
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES&LAwS 1607-1789: GEORGIATREATIES 1733-1763, at 15-17 (dealing

with various issues such as returning escaped slaves) (Alden T. Vaughan et al. eds., 1989).
69. See, e.g., Letter from Superintendent Stuart to the Earl of Egremont (Dec. 5, 1763), in 11 EARLY
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES & LAws, 1607-1789: GEORGIA TREATIES 1733-1763, at 359-61

(describing attempts to lessen ill will amongst several tribes in the southeast).
70. See Report of Committee on Indian Affairs (Oct. 15, 1783), in 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 680-93 (1922) (detailing the need for negotiations and establishing trade regulations).
71. See Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs (Aug. 7, 1786), in 31 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 488-93 (1934) (establishing two districts with superintendents and
deputies).
72. Benjamin Hawkins (1754-1818) was a good example. He was a long-time Indian agent with the Creeks
(1796-1818), a position he took after having served in the Continental Congress and after having been a U.S.
Senator. See WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, Benjamin Hawkins, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/BenjaminHawkins (last visited July 7, 2004).
73. See, e.g., A sketch of the present state ofthe objects under the charge ofthe principal agent for Indian
affairs, South of the Ohio (1801), 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, INDIAN AFFAIRS 647-48 (1823) (submitted by
Benjamin Hawkins and mentioning the problem of licensing traders). This particular sketch actually described
judicial proceedings dealing mostly with criminal prosecution of thefts and involving the means for dealing with
white and Indian defendants. Id. at 648.
74. See, e.g., Letter of Sept. 9, 1815, from General William Henry Harrison to W.H. Crawford, Secretary
of War, 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, INDIAN AFFAIRS 16-17 (1823) (detailing, among other things, actions he took
to settle claims brought by individual tribal members against the United States for homes burned and horses
wrongfully stolen by the U.S. militia).
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resolving unpaid debts was a tool that the United States used aggressively to induce
treaty concessions from tribal leaders.75 For example, Thomas Jefferson saw the
federal control of Indian trade as a tool for acquiring tribal lands by facilitating debt
creation among tribal leaders.76 Payment of these debts could and did occur through
the treaty process.77
Until the latter part of the nineteenth century, tribal taxation was quite rare. As
a result, tribal taxation of non-members and associated collection problems were
virtually unknown. But in the midst of the allotment period, the Creek Nation
created a permit tax that applied to non-members who traded within the boundaries
of the Nation. In a case involving this tribal tax, Buster v. Wright,78 the taxpayer
objected to payment on the grounds that federal legislation allowing him to79
purchase land within the Creek Nation divested the Nation of its power to tax him.
The court, after a close reading of the treaties and federal statutes, concluded that
the Creek Nation's inherent power to tax had not been diminished by the conversion
of tribal land to fee land owned by a non-member.8" Of greater importance to this
article, the federal court discussed the role of federal court enforcement of the tax
liability and found that federal enforcement through federal officials was
appropriate. 81 The facts in Buster, however, did not involve off-reservation
enforcement of the tax liability. Instead, the court validated the federal Indian
agent's removal of the non-complying taxpayer from the Creek Nation as an
appropriate remedy and one imposed by the law of the Creek Nation. Nonetheless,
if federal enforcement is appropriate, then full faith and credit, as a tool to enforce
tribal court tax judgments, may be unnecessary. Under the Buster approach, federal
enforcement transcends state boundaries. We will take up the Buster case later in
part IV when I discuss a federal common law approach to the enforcement of tribal
court tax judgments.
As some tribes developed legal institutions resembling Anglo-American ones, a
full faith and credit mechanism was conceptually possible. The critical feature is a
system that produces written records from a tribunal having some independence. By
the mid-nineteenth century, legal institutions among the tribes within the Indian
Territory were using written documents and tribunals resembling state courts. An
early example of off-reservation recognition of tribal legal proceedings is Mackey
v. Coxe.82 The U.S. Supreme Court construed a federal statute allowing claims
against the government based on letters of probate administration issued in a state
or territory.83 The Court determined that the Cherokee Nation was a territory for

75. See FRANCIS PAuL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANOMALY
219-23 (1994) (detailing the practice of paying debts to Indian traders through treaty provisions).
76. Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Governor William H. Harrison (Feb. 27, 1803), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 368, 369-71 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1903)
(specifically stating that pushing tribal leaders into debts they could not repay would make them "willing to lop
them off by a cession of lands").
77. PRUCHA, supra note 75, at 219-23.
78. 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905).
79. Id. at 952.
80. Id. at 953.

81.

Id. at 954-55.

82.
83.

United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. 100 (1856).
Id. at 103.
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purposes of that statute and concluded that the tribal proceeding appointing the
administrators was valid.84 A string of old Eighth Circuit cases,85 although not
relying on Mackey, essentially took the same approach regarding the effect of a
variety of tribal legal proceedings. One of the cases summarized the approach by
stating that "the judgments of the courts of these [Indian] nations, in cases within
their jurisdiction, stand on the same footing with those of the courts of the
territories of the Union and are entitled to the same faith and credit. '8 6 These
decisions did not rely on any specific federal statute even though the predecessor
to 28 U.S.C. § 1738 was in force in substantially the same form as today.
But by the end of the nineteenth century, federal Indian policy had become
aggressively assimilationist and made the destruction of tribal institutions a national
priority. To give tribal court judgments full faith and credit during this period would
have been inconsistent with a policy that desired to solve the "Indian problem" by
destroying tribal governments. A full faith and credit mechanism would have
validated the existence and credibility of tribal governments. This may explain why
the group of old Eighth Circuit cases seemed to disappear into oblivion during this
time.
But do these old Eighth Circuit cases have any enduring value? They certainly
hold that full faith and credit should apply to tribal court proceedings. These cases
could actually validate Professor Clinton's view that the language of section 1738
includes tribes. 87 Accordingly, I ask the reader's pardon for a digression in which
we consider how these cases and the full faith and credit rules in the Defense of
Marriage Act might affect Professor Clinton's argument.
The language in section 1738 that he refers to is as follows:
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated,
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States
and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of
such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken. 8
Clinton takes the phrase "every court within the United States" and asserts that a
tribal court is a court and that it is within the United States.8 9 He adds further,
however, that the term "court," as used in section 1738, means a "western-style"
court. 90 And by "western-style" we assume he means a court that is in the AngloAmerican legal tradition. Under Clinton's reading of section 1738, then, tribal
courts are required to give full faith and credit to state court judgments. Under the
Supreme Court's holding in Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co.,9' the full faith

84. Id. at 104 (stating that the Cherokee Nation was "a territory of the United States, within the act of
1812").

85. See Mehlin v. Ice, 56 F. 12 (8th Cir. 1893) (ejectment action); Exendine v. Pore, 56 F. 777 (8th Cir.
1893) (wrongful detainer action); Standley v. Roberts, 59 F. 836 (8th Cir. 1894) (dismissal of an injunction);
Comells v. Shannon, 63 F. 305 (8th Cir. 1894) (quarantine regulation); Raymond v. Raymond, 83 F. 721 (8th Cir.
1897) (divorce proceeding); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905) (tribal tax).
86. Standley v. Roberts, 59 F. 836, 845 (8th Cir. 1897).
87. See Clinton, supra note 14, at 897-921.
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).
89. Clinton, supra note 14, at 901.
90. See Ransom et al., supra note 16, at 243.
91. 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
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and credit obligation extends to tax judgments of state courts. A more logical
reading of "every court of the United States" is that the reference is limited to those
courts enumerated earlier in the statute, courts of a state, territory, or possession of
the United States. Otherwise, Clinton's reading makes little sense.
Why enforce a provision that diminishes tribal sovereignty based on language
from 1804? In 1804 the federal view was clear: Native American governments were
outside the political framework of the United States and were governed by their
own laws.92 The 1804 change to the 179093 version of section 1738 came about to
accommodate the expansion of the United States after the addition of the Louisiana
Purchase.9 4 The legislation setting up the territorial government had provisions
relating to Native American governments,9 5 and none of these related to the full
faith and credit statute.
In general, then, the early legislative history of section 1738 provides no support
for Professor Clinton's position. Some recent federal legislation, however, does
help his argument. The enactment in 1996 by Congress of the full faith and credit
provision in the Defense of Marriage Act 96 actually provides Professor Clinton with
a far better argument. This provision states:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any
other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other
State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship.97
The purpose of this provision was to eliminate the federal mandate of granting full
faith and credit to same-sex marriages under the rule that a marriage celebrated
under the law of one state is valid in all other states.9" We notice that foreign
marriages are not mentioned. Congress omits these because comity, not full faith
and credit, applies to them. And comity means no federal mandate. Why, in 1996,
would Congress remove from tribes a federal mandate that does not exist? Congress
would have extended the reach of section 1738C to tribes only if it believed that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause in the Constitution or its enabling legislation applied
to tribes. The explanation in the Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary

92. See Robert N. Clinton, There Is No FederalSupremacy ClauseforIndianTribes, 34ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113,
137 (2002) (explaining the American view in the early nineteenth century that tribes were self-governing and lay
outside the constitutional framework of the United States).
93. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. XI, I Stat. 122.
94. For the 1804 version of section 1738, see Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. LVI, 2 Stat. 298-99. For the statute
establishing the territorial governments for the Louisiana Purchase, see Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. XXXVIH, 2 Stat.
283-89.
95. Within the statute establishing the territory of Louisiana, several provisions make it quite clear that
Congress viewed tribes as something other than a territory. See Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. XXXVIII, 2 Stat. 283-89.
For example, section 7 of the statute specifically incorporated the federal law regulating Indian trade, id. at 285,
section 9 limited juries to "free white males," which indicated exclusion of Native Americans from the judicial
institutions established in the statute, id. at 286, and section 15 dealt directly with questions of tribal territory and
authorized the President to cede lands to tribes willing to move west of the Mississippi. Id. at 289.
96. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2, 110 Stat. 2419.
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
98. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 23-25, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2927-31.
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makes no mention of tribes and why the legislation includes them. We can guess
that Congress mentioned tribes "just-in-case" it turned out that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause or its enabling legislation was interpreted as applying to tribes. Is this
a sufficient basis for looking again at the meaning of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and its enabling legislation? I do not think so. 9 But I digress.I°° We here end
our digression and return to a consideration of the historical development of federal
Indian policy and its implications for full faith and credit.
In 1934, with the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act,' federal Indian
policy officially changed and encouraged the growth of Native American governments and the development of the necessary institutions of government.' °2 These
encouraged institutions included tribal courts.0 3 Except for the termination period
in the 1950s and 1960s, federal policy has continued to encourage tribal courts."°4
With the development of tribal court systems, we would expect to see the question
of full faith and credit reflected in the reported decisions.
The application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause (to tribal court judgments in
state courts or state court judgments in tribal courts) is not mandated by the
language of the clause itself. The clause applies only to states. No federal courts
have found that a tribe is a state for purposes of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
And, if anything, the 1778 treaty with the Delaware shows that statehood would
have been a formal and obvious process and not a slow evolution in which we wake
up one morning to find that a tribe has become a state.
Some tribal, state, and federal cases, however, have addressed full faith and
credit issues outside the constitutional context. Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1738
to govern the interstate recognition ofjudgments. As just discussed, the statute goes
beyond the mandate contained in the Full Faith and Credit Clause in the
Constitution and requires that full faith and credit be accorded to judicial
proceedings of states, territories, and possessions of the United States. Tribes are
not states, as we know, but could a tribe be a territory or a possession for purposes

99. A later Congress cannot control the interpretation of an earlier enacted statute. See United States v.
Price, 361 U.S. 304, 310-11 (1960); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 479-80 (1940). But see United States v.
Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 235 n.6 (1992).
100. And now I digress even further on another side, but relevant, point. In the latter part of the nineteenth
century, a federal/tribal court system developed during a period when federal policy was aggressively promoting
assimilation of Native Americans. These tribunals were known as Courts of Indian Offenses. See generallyAnnual
Report of the Secretary of Interior,House Executive Document No. 1, 48th Con., 1st sess., serial 2190, at xxiii.
As the name implies, the courts were primarily criminal. The judges were Native Americans and members of the
tribe in which the court operated. These courts, however, were instruments of the federal assimilationist policy and
were designed to eradicate "heathenish" practices that the Secretary of the Interior believed to be detrimental to the
progress and improvement of Native Americans. Because these courts exercised only criminal jurisdiction, they
could not serve a function of recognizing state court judgments nor produce judgments that required recognition
off the reservation. By any measure, the Courts of Indian Offenses were overtly racist, denied freedom of religion,
and furthered the cultural genocide that occurred during the allotment period. See Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court
Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285 (1998) (describing these
courts as "tools of colonialism").
101. See The Wheeler-Howard Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984.
102. See id. § 16, at 987 (enabling tribes to adopt constitutions and establish governmental institutions).
103. Although tribal courts are not specifically mentioned in the Wheeler-Howard Act, many tribal
constitutions adopted under the statute included tribal court systems.
104. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy ofAllotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 78 (1995).
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of section 1738? A number of cases have looked at this question and have come up
with different answers.
A. Cases Rejecting Full Faithand Credit
The leading federal case on the question is Wilson v. Marchington.01 5 The Ninth
Circuit held that neither the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution nor 28
U.S.C. § 1738 applies to tribal court judgments. 10 6 The court declined to apply
section 1738 because the use of the words "territory" and "possession" did not seem
to include an Indian tribe. 07 The court noted that some other more specific federal
full faith and credit rules specifically used the phrase "Indian tribe" to denote
application of the rule to tribal courtjudgments. t0 8 The court reasoned that Congress
would have mentioned Indian tribes if it had intended to include them within the
sweep of the full faith and credit rule contained in section 1738."° In passing, the
court noted that the "territory" and "possession" language in the predecessor to
section 1738 was added in 1804.110 The court did not infer anything from the
vintage of the section 1738 language, but it should have been obvious to the court
that this was the year after Thomas Jefferson had completed the Louisiana
Purchase."' The better part of this territory was in possession of Indian tribes and
would require extinguishment of Indian title." 2 It is obvious that in 1804 Congress
was not prepared to accept tribal court judgments in state or territorial courts.
In fact, the 1804 version of section 1738 was passed one day after the act that
created the government of the Louisiana Territory. ' 13 The statute, which, among
other things, created the Territory and established a court system, specifically
referenced the full faith and credit provision. 114 So, it is clear that Congress was
thinking of the Louisiana Territory and its newly minted judicial system. Because
the territory had within it numerous Native American governments, these were
treated in other related legislation with no hint that full faith and credit for tribal
court judgments would be a feature of the legal system." 5 Taken as a whole, this
group of related legislation makes it clear that Congress did not want to extend full
faith and credit to tribal court judgments. Instead, the legislative picture is one in

105. 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997).
106. Id. at 808-09.
107. Id.
108. Id.at 809.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 808.
Ill. For the 1804 version of section 1738, see Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. LVI, 2 Stat. 298-99. For the statute
establishing the territorial governments for the Louisiana Purchase, see Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. XXXVIII, 2 Stat.
283-89.
112. The legislation creating the territorial government for the Louisiana Purchase acknowledged that the
presence of tribes required extinguishment of Indian title through treaties and purchase. See Act of Mar. 26, 1804,
ch. XXXVII, § 15, 2 Stat. 283, 289 (authorizing the President to enter into treaties with tribes and negotiate their
consent to remove to areas west of the Mississippi).
113. Congress passed the full faith and credit enabling legislation on March 27, 1804, and the legislation
setting up the territorial government of the Louisiana Purchase on March 26, 1804.
114. See Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. XXXVIII, § 7, 2 Stat. 283, 285.
115. See, e.g., id. § 15, at 289.
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which Congress is keeping a clear political
and.,physical boundary between the
1 16
white Americans and the Indian tribes.'
Under the Wilson case, then, states, as a matter of federal law, are not required
to afford full faith and credit to tribal court judgments. Instead, the doctrine of
comity applies to tribal court judgments." 7 Comity is, as we know, the judgment
recognition rule that allows, but does not require, one court to recognize and
enforce the judgments of another court. It is important to contrast this with full faith
and credit where, as a matter of federal law, one state must recognize the judgment
of a sister state. In applying comity, states are free to develop their own judgmentrecognition rules.
The comity rules come from the federal common law, according to the Wilson
court, when enforcement of a tribal court judgment is sought in a federal court." 8
The court specifically refused to apply the comity standards of the state of Montana,
the state in which the plaintiff was seeking enforcement." 9 The court reasoned that
enforcement of a tribal court judgment by a federal court had primarily a federal
character and, therefore, justified application of the federal common law instead of
any state decisional or statutory law that might apply. 120 This part of the opinion
seems to suggest that federal recognition of a tribal court judgment actually
preempts state law.' 2' This could mean that other aspects of state law in the
collection process may be preempted. 122 State law provides exemptions from the
execution of judgments. 123 Would the federal common law preempt these? For
example, federal tax collection laws preempt state exemption laws and thereby
make the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) a super creditor. 24 Thus far, we do not
know if enforceable tribal court judgments will be subject to state exemption laws
when a federal court is the collection court. We must await further development of
this area of tribal/federal/state law.
In Wilson, the court refused to extend comity to the tribal court judgment
"because the tribal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction."'' 25 The underlying
action arose out of a car accident on the Blackfeet reservation in Montana. 26 The
plaintiff was a member of the tribe and was injured by the defendant who was not
a tribal member.'2 7 The accident occurred on a state highway built on a right-of-way

116. See, e.g., id. § 9, at 286 (limiting jury pool to "free male white persons").
117. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1997).
118. Id.at 813 ("We apply federal common law...").
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.("[T]he quintessentially federal character of Native American law, coupled with the imperative of
consistency in federal recognition of tribal court judgments, by necessity require that the ultimate decision
governing the recognition and enforcement of a tribal judgment by the United States be founded on federal law.").
122. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2001 (2000) (federal statute governing judicial sale by federal courts of real
property). Presumably, such a federal statute would preempt any state statute governing judicial sales of real
property.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Heasley, 283 F.2d 422, 427 (8th Cir. 1960) (state right of redemption was
preempted in federal foreclosure action brought to enforce a federal tax lien).
124. See id.
125. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 813 (9th Cir. 1997).
126. Id.at 807.
127. Id.
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granted to Montana under a federal statute. 2 The Ninth Circuit's finding of no
subject matter jurisdiction is an extension of the Supreme Court's holding in Strate
v. A-] Contractors,129 a case in which the Court held that the tribal court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over a lawsuit between two non-members who had a car
accident on a state road on the Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota.'
One would have thought that a Native American government's court would have
jurisdiction over torts that occur within its political boundaries and that a right of
way would not diminish its jurisdiction. Strate,however, extended the language of
an earlier case, Montana v. United States, 3 ' in which the Supreme Court said that
a tribe did not have general civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on lands within the
reservation if the lands are not owned by the tribe. 32 This general rule of no civil
the reservation was subject to two
jurisdiction over non-Indian lands within
33
exceptions, neither of which applied.1
As a result, the Court in Strate found that the state highway built over a right-of134
way was not owned by the tribe and that neither of the two exceptions applied.
Therefore, the tribal court had no subject matterjurisdiction. An ancillary rationale
of Strate was that the tribe had no interest in adjudicating the tort claim of two nonIndians who had a car accident on a state road that just happened to be on the Fort
Berthold reservation. The accident, however, occurred within the reservation
boundaries, so obviously the Court's acceptance of jurisdiction demonstrates that
it has an interest.135 Accordingly, the court's rationale is spurious. The bottom line
is that the Supreme Court does not trust tribal courts to dispense justice to nonIndians.
36
The real problem with Strate is its reliance on Montana v. United States.1 The
Montana case involved the Crow Tribe's attempt to regulate fishing on the Big
Horn River. 13' The Big Horn River, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, belonged
to the state of Montana. Montana, not the Crow Tribe, owned the river because it
was a navigable river that was impliedly reserved for Montana when Congress

128. Id. at 813-14.
129. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
130. Id. at 442-43,456.
131. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).

132. Id. at 566-67.
133.

Id. at 565-66.

To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may
regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts,
leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority
over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens
or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare
of the tribe.

Id. (citations omitted).
134. 520 U.S. at 456-58.
135. Strate has been the subject of ample scholarly commentary, including those who have looked in detail
at the strength of the tribal interest. See, e.g., Wambdi Awanwicake Wastewin, Native Nations, 74 N.D. L. REV.
711, 712 (1998) (detailing the connections of the parties to the tribe).
136. 450U.S.544(1981).
137. Id. at 547.
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admitted it as a state to the union. 3 ' Reserving title in the river for Montana was
required under the equal footing doctrine, a doctrine that requires all new states to
be admitted on an equal footing with the original thirteen states. 139 The thirteen
states were the owners of their navigable rivers. Unfortunately, the federal
government had established the Crow reservation before Montana's admission and
never undertook any action to renegotiate the title to the river. 40 Instead, well after
the fact, Montana and the federal government essentially told the tribe, "Oh, we
forgot to tell you that the river we said was yours isn't really yours. You see there's
this obscure legal doctrine we should have explained to you, but it wasn't really
clear enough to us then to explain it to you, and you wouldn't have understood it
anyway. So, Montana gets to regulate your river. Well, we mean Montana owns the
river and, therefore, has the power to regulate it."
Instead of leaving Montana as a case that deals with state jurisdiction over
navigable rivers, the Court, thinking it was doing tribes a favor, gratuitously said:
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms
of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian
fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or
its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority
over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. 4'
Under the facts of the case, these words are dicta because the Montana case
involved the effect of the equal footing doctrine on navigable rivers within
reservations. The dicta from Montana spoke to all of those future and innumerable
cases in which a tribe exercises civil jurisdiction over lands within its reservation
when those lands are not owned by the tribe. As a matter of simple logic, a
government ordinarily exercises civil jurisdiction over lands and people within its
political boundaries. In the case of tribes, their civil jurisdiction is an inherent
attribute of sovereignty that remains intact until given up by treaty, taken away by
legislation enacted by Congress, or lost by "necessary implication of their
dependent status."' 14 2 The Montana dicta and its two exceptions do not fall within
any of these three ways in which a tribe can lose its sovereignty. Instead, the
Montana rule just precipitates out of the judicial ether without rhyme and without
reason. Since its Montana decision, the Supreme Court holds up the Montana dicta

138. Id. at 551-57.
139. Id. at 551.
140. See id. at 550-51.
141. Id. at 565-66 (citations omitted).
142. Washington v. Confederated Tribe, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980) (applying this rule in the context of tribal
taxation). The "necessary implication of their dependent status" language is referred to as the implicit divestiture
doctrine. Many commentators find the doctrine to have virtually no legal or logical support. See, e.g., Alex
Tallchief Skibine, The Court's Use of the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine to Implement Its Imperfect Notion of
Federalism in Indian Country, 36 TULSA L.J. 267 (2000). I count myself within the camp of these critics. It is the
implicit divesture doctrine that the U.S. Supreme Court has used incorrectly to contract the political sovereignty
of tribes.
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as if the words' 43were a divine inspiration, describing the two "exceptions" as
"pathmarking."' Indeed, the Montana dicta mark a path of destruction that has
reduced tribal sovereignty to the point where congressional intervention will be
necessary.
In sum, then, the decision in Wilson that the Full Faith and Credit Clause and
section 1738 do not apply to tribal court judgments off the reservation seems correct
to me. In addition, the application of comity as the doctrine to determine
enforceability also seems correct, although I think that the federal common law
needs to customize the comity rule so that tribal court judgments receive more
deference than judgments from foreign countries.'" After all, federally recognized
tribes are subject to the legislative authority of Congress. Finally, the ruling in
Wilson that the tribal court had no subject matter jurisdiction under Strate is wrong
because both Strate and the Montana dicta reduce tribal civil jurisdiction without
legal justification. Unfortunately, tribes have no near-term prospect of regaining the
sovereignty lost in Montana and subsequent cases.
The Ninth Circuit continues to follow Wilson and its comity approach for the
recognition of tribal court judgments.'4 5 Some of the cases 146 are like Wilson in that
the tribal court's jurisdiction is disputed under an argument based on Montana and
Strate. In these cases, the enforcement of the tribal court judgment is an issue only
if the tribal court litigation has preceded the federal court litigation. This is not
always the case. In some instances, the party objecting to tribal court jurisdiction
goes to the federal court to stop the tribal court action, which then raises the
question of whether this party must exhaust tribal remedies before seeking federal
review. 147 Exhaustion of tribal remedies is unnecessary if (1) an assertion of tribal
jurisdiction "is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith,"' 148 (2)
the action patently violates express jurisdictional prohibitions, or (3) "exhaustion
would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the
court's jurisdiction.' ' 49 So, in the cases in which exhaustion is not required, a
federal court's finding of no tribal court jurisdiction occurs before a tribal court
proceeding ever gets rolling to the point of producing a judgment.
In other cases, the loser in tribal court seeks federal court review asserting that
the tribal court has no jurisdiction. We should think of this as negative comity. If
the losing party in tribal court does not convince the federal court that the tribal
court lacked jurisdiction, then presumably the tribal court judgment, order, or
determination remains valid and is enforceable in the federal court. McDonald v.

143. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358 (2001).
144. This is explicit in Wilson, in which the court concludes that "Indian law is uniquely federal in nature."
127 F.3d 805, 813 (9th Cir. 1997).
145. See, e.g., McDonald v. Means, 309 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 2002) (tort case involving a tribal member and
an Indian from another tribe on a Bureau of Indian Affairs road; appellate court reversed trial court's refusal to
extend comity to tribal court's judgment).
146. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 295 F.3d 899, 901,903-04 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding no
jurisdiction but stating that comity would have been appropriate had there been jurisdiction).
147. See Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
148. Id. at 856 n.21 (quoting Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338 (1977) (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975))).
149. Id.
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Means"'° is a good example of this: another car accident, this time on a BIA road
on the Northern Cheyenne reservation in Montana and involving a tribal member
(Means) and a non-member (McDonald) who resided on the reservation and who
was a member of another tribe (Ogalala Sioux). 51
' McDonald lost in tribal court and
mounted a collateral challenge in federal court.' 52 He asserted that the tribal court
lackedj urisdiction under Stratebecause the road was the equivalent of alienated fee
land and that, as a result, the tribal court could acquire no jurisdiction over him
unless the circumstances came within one of the two Montana exceptions.'53 The
federal trial court agreed with him,' 54 but the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that a
BIA road is different from a state road.'55 The right of way did not terminate the
tribe's ownership interest in the road. 5 6 Therefore, the tribal court had general
adjudicatory authority over McDonald.5 7 Obviously, the Ninth Circuit's decision
recognizes the legal validity of the tribal court decision. No discussion of comity
occurred because Means was not seeking actual enforcement of the judgment.
Having ultimately lost in the Ninth Circuit, McDonald may have paid Means
voluntarily.
Bird v. GlacierElectric Cooperative, Inc.'58 is a good example of a case like
Wilson, where comity was explicitly on the table. In Bird,the prevailing party from
the tribal court action originating in the Blackfeet Tribal Court sought enforcement
in the federal district court in Montana. 5 9 The Birdcourt refused to extend comity
to the underlying tribal court judgment because the tribal court adjudication failed
to provide minimal due process for the defendants. 16 The Bird case permits wider
latitude of collateral attack on a tribal court judgment because the standard is
comity, not full faith and credit.
Amongst these Ninth Circuit cases, we find a tax case in which a tribal tax is in
dispute: Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. Assiniboine and Sioux
Tribes. 6 ' The taxpayer railroad challenged the legislative authority of the Tribe to
impose a property tax on Burlington Northern Santa Fe's right-of-way through the
reservation. 162 Once again, Montana and Strate provide the basis for arguing that
the tax should not apply. 163 The taxpayer railroad asserted that the right-of-way is
the equivalent of fee land. 6' Under the Supreme Court's decision in Atkinson
Trading Co. v. Shirley,165 a tribe cannot impose a tax on a nonmember engaged in

150. 309 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 2002).
151. Id. at 535-36.
152. Id. at 536.
153. See id.

154. Id.
155.

Id.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 537.
Id. at 538.
255 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1138.
Id. at 1152 (concluding that the plaintiffs "appeal to racial prejudice in closing argument in its civil

case in tribal court offended fundamental fairness and violated due process owed" to the defendant).
161. 323 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2003).

162. Id. at 768-69.
163. Id. at 769.
164. See id.
165. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
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66
activity on fee land unless one of the Montana exceptions applies.' So, the

taxpayer railroad in BurlingtonNorthern Santa Fe RailroadCo. contended that the
right-of-way was the equivalent to fee land, that it had not entered into a consensual
relationship with the Tribe, and that the payment of the tax was not mandated by a
critical governmental need of the tribe. 167 As of the date of writing this article, the
case is pending in tribal court for further discovery to give the tribal tax authority
the opportunity to establish a critical governmental need. Comity is not the question
in Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad Co. because it is the taxpayer that is
attacking in federal court the validity of the tribal court determination. If the federal
court ultimately holds for the Tribe and validates its taxing power, then comity
would be an appropriate avenue to provide the Tribe with a method for collecting
the tax it is owed.
Surprisingly, the state court cases that have refused to accord full faith and credit
to tribal court judgments under a federal theory are relatively rare. The scarcity of
state cases reflects, perhaps, the infrequency with which holders of tribal court
judgments seek enforcement in state or federal courts. Or perhaps holders of such
judgments, if they are Native Americans, are not very optimistic that they will
receive full faith and credit for their judgments.
The earliest known state case is Begay v. Miller,168 which is quite instructive. The
Arizona Supreme Court was required to decide whether a divorce granted by 6a9
Navajo Nation court to two members of the Nation was valid under Arizona law. 1
The court found that full faith and credit did not apply, nor did comity. 7 ' Instead,
the court merely stated that it was prepared to recognize a divorce that was valid
under the law of the jurisdiction where granted. 7 ' The court considered one of the
old Eighth Circuit cases, Raymond v. Raymond,'72 but concluded it was not
controlling because that case involved a treaty provision in which the Tribe was
given sole jurisdiction of domestic affairs. 7 3 The Arizona court found no such
provision in the Begay case.' 74 Since Begay, the Arizona courts once again rejected
full faith and credit' 75 but affirmatively endorsed comity. 17 6 Under its comity
approach, Arizona treats a tribal court judgment as though it comes from a foreign
court. 7 7

166. Id. at 654.
167. 323 F.3d at 769.
168. 222 P.2d 624 (Ariz. 1950).
169. Id. at 625-26. The case arose through a habeas corpus petition challenging Mr. Begay's incarceration
for failure to pay spousal support under an Arizona divorce decree. Id. Mr. Begay asserted that the Arizona court
had no jurisdiction to enter the order of support because he had already been divorced by a Navajo court. Id.
170. Id. at 628 (mentioning and rejecting full faith and credit and the application of comity).
171. Id.
172. 83 F. 721 (8th Cir. 1897).
173. Begay, 222 P.2d at 626.
174. Id.
175. See Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (rejecting full faith and credit in
a choice of law context involving the lawfulness of an on-reservation repossession of a vehicle by an Arizona
creditor and basing that conclusion on a reading of the word "territory" in 28 U.S.C. § 1738 as not including Indian
tribes).
176. Id. at 695 (stating a willingness to apply comity in a choice of law context if it did not violate the public
policy of Arizona).
177. Id. (citing Lynch v. Olsen (In re Estate of Lynch), 377 P.2d 199 (Ariz. 1962) (giving comity to judicial
proceedings of the Navajo Nation as if they were from a "foreign country")).
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Another early case comes from the Oregon Court of Appeals. 7 ' The court
refused to extend full faith and credit to a tribal divorce decree on the grounds that
a federally recognized Indian tribe is not a sister state for purposes of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 7 9 The court did not consider application
of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 and, consequently, did not consider or decide whether a tribe
was a territory or a possession within the meaning of the statute.180 Instead, the court
treated the tribal court divorce decree the same as a judgment from a foreign
country and extended comity to it.' 8 ' After applying comity standards, the court
182
ruled that Oregon courts were required to recognize the tribal court decree.
Minnesota, 83 Montana,8 4 North Dakota,8 5 and South Dakota 86 also have cases in
which a state appellate court refused to grant full faith and credit.
B. Cases Finding Full Faith and Creditas a Matterof FederalLaw
The earliest federal court to extend full faith and credit to a tribal court
determination was the old Eighth Circuit in Mehlin v. Ice. 18 7 Ice, the occupier of
land within the Cherokee Nation, was ejected by a writ issued by the clerk of the
Cherokee court. 88 Ice challenged the validity of the writ in the federal territorial
court.' 8 9 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that a valid writ issued by the Cherokee
court was entitled to full faith and credit. 1° The federal court did not refer to the full
faith and credit enabling legislation but instead reasoned that federal recognition
was appropriate given the important federal role in preserving the sovereignty of the
Cherokee Nation.' 9'
Raymond v. Raymond 92 comes from the same court and involved the validity of
a Cherokee divorce. The court, as in the Ice case, did not rely on the Full Faith and

178. In re Marriage of Red Fox, 542 P.2d 918 (Or. Ct. App. 1975).
179. Id. at 920.
180. See id.
181. Id. at 921.
182. Id. at 922-23. The Oregon Court of Appeals faced the full faith and credit issue in Moses v. KalamaScott, 84 P.3d 1097, 1100 (Or. Ct. App. 2004), and implied that it would have applied to a tribal court adjudication
except that the prevailing party had not established proper notice to the losing party.
183. See Desjarlait v. Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d 139, 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (denying full faith and credit
because a tribe is not a state).
184. See Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe, 654 P.2d 512 (Mont. 1982) (rejecting full faith and credit and applying
comity to a tribal court judgment).
185. See Malaterre v. Malaterre, 293 N.W.2d 139, 144 (N.D. 1980) (denying full faith and credit because
tribe was not a state).
186. See Mexican v. Circle Bear, 370 N.W.2d 737, 741 (S.D. 1985) (applying comity, not full faith and
credit).
187. 56 F. 12 (8th Cir. 1893). Arguably, the U.S. Supreme Court case of United States ex rel Mackey v.
Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1856), is the first reported federal case considering full faith and credit. But Mackey
involved the application of an 1812 federal statute allowing someone who was granted probate letters of
administration by a territorial authority to bring a suit in the federal court against the United States. Id.
The statute
did not provide full faith and credit and the court did not use that language. Id.Instead, the court applied the federal
statute to letters of administration issued by the Cherokee Nation because the court viewed the tribe as a territory.
See id. at 103-04.
188. See Mehlin, 56 F. at 1, 12-13.
189. Id. at 13-14.
190. Id. at 19.
191. Id.
192. 83 F. 721 (8th Cir. 1897).
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Credit Clause contained in the Constitution or in the applicable federal statute.
Instead, the court looked to the treaties and federal legislation and found by
implication, with little reasoning, that full faith and credit should apply. 93 Those
two sources of law made it quite clear that the United States and the Cherokee
Nation agreed that Cherokee courts would determine issues involving marital status
between tribal members. 194 In Raymond, a non-member of the tribe who was a U.S.
citizen married a tribal member and was adopted by the tribe. 95 The two later
divorced, and the U.S. citizen went through a naturalization process to re-establish
her U.S. citizenship.' 96 She then sued for divorce in the territorial court and sought
alimony, which the court granted.' 97 On appeal, the court found that she had never

lost her U.S. citizenship.' 98 Instead, she had merely gained membership in the
Cherokee Nation.' 99 It was her Cherokee membership that gave the Cherokee court
jurisdiction over the marriage by operation of the treaties and federal statutes."'
Essentially, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the political arrangement between the
Cherokee Nation and the United States required the federal courts to recognize the
tribal court decree. The Eighth Circuit did not use the precise phrase "full faith and
credit," did not rely on the Full Faith and Credit Clause in the Constitution, and did
not base its decision on the full faith and credit enabling statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
Instead, the court found that the Cherokee divorce was "entitled to all the faith and
credit accorded to the judgments and decrees of territorial courts."' 20' The Eighth
Circuit decided three additional cases worthy of note because they involved
instances in which the court gave deference to tribal court actions. 2
Because of age, these old Eighth Circuit cases may have lost their persuasive
value and do not contain the succinct reasoning found in the Ninth Circuit's
Wilson2 °3 decision. Nonetheless, this line of cases appears to remain good law in the
Eighth Circuit. And because the Eighth Circuit split into the Tenth Circuit, these
cases are precedent in both circuits. 2' The Tenth and Eight Circuits contain about
100 federally recognized Indian tribes. 2 5 As a result, these cases provide a basis for
asserting that federal law mandates extension of full faith and credit to tribal court
tax judgments and could be used to call into question the contrary state case law in
Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota. The strength of these cases is
193. Id. at 722-23.
194. Id.at 722.
195. Id. at 721,723.

196. Id.
197. Id. at 721-22.
198. Id. at 723-24.

199. Id.
200. Id. at 724.
201.

Id. at 722 (citing, inter alia, Mehlin v. Ice, 56 F. 12 (8th Cir. 1893)).

202. See Exendine v. Pore, 59 F. 836 (8th Cir. 1893) (wrongful detainer); Standley v. Roberts, 59 F. 836 (8th
Cir. 1894) (dismissal of an injunction); Comells v. Shannon, 63 F. 305 (8th Cir. 1894) (quarantine regulation).
203.

127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997).

204. See McMorris v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue (Estate of McMorris), 243 F.3d 1254, 1259 (10th Cir.
2001) (suggesting that old Eighth Circuit cases decided within the geographic area that became the Tenth Circuit
would be precedent in the newly created Tenth Circuit); Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 363, § 5, 45 Stat. 1346, 1348.
205. The Eighth Circuit contains Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South
Dakota, and the Tenth Circuit contains Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Wyoming, and Utah. Together,

these states have about 100 federally recognized Indian tribes. See BIA Map of Indian Country, in STEPHEN L.
PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES xviii-ixx (2002).
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undermined, however, because the Eighth Circuit never really developed the idea
that the full faith and credit requirement it recognized and applied originated in the
constitutional clause or came from its enabling legislation.
The earliest state case to find that the full faith and credit rules of 28 U.S.C. §
1738 apply to tribes is Jim v. CIT FinancialServices Corp.,2°6 a New Mexico
Supreme Court case. The Jim case was actually a choice of law question that arose
when Allen Jim, a member of the Navajo Nation, attempted to sue for damages in
a New Mexico court for wrongful repossession of his motor vehicle.2 °7 Mr. Jim had
purchased the vehicle outside the reservation and within New Mexico. 2 8 He
financed the purchase and later defaulted on the payments. 29 The lender's agents
then entered the Navajo Nation and repossessed the vehicle. 2" The repossession
was legal under the law of New Mexico but violated a Navajo Nation law that
required either consent of the owner or a court order prior to repossession.2 11
Violation of the Navajo law entitled Mr. Jim to damages against the lender.21 2 The
trial court dismissed Mr. Jim's complaint on the grounds that New Mexico, and not
Navajo, law applied and rendered the repossession perfectly legal.213 The New
Mexico Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed the dismissal. 214 The New Mexico
Supreme Court, however, disagreed and found that section 1738 applied to Indian
tribes and required the New Mexico trial court to apply Navajo law because the
repossession occurred on the Navajo Nation.2" 5
Jim v. CIT FinancialServices Corp. received immediate negative commentary
from Fred Ragsdale, then a professor at the University of New Mexico. 216 Ragsdale
viewed the legislative history of section 1738 as conclusive. He was unable to see
any suggestion that Congress intended to extend full faith and credit to tribes by
implying that tribes were territories.2" 7 Ragsdale concluded that "the legal
arguments available for urging the extension of full faith and credit to Indian tribes
are inadequate., 2 8 Nonetheless, Ragsdale concluded that full faith and credit should
be extended to Indian tribes on public policy grounds because recognition of each
other's judgments would promote beneficial tribal-state relations.21 9 He was
concerned that tribes, because they generally lacked appellate court systems then,
could not provide a sufficiently neutral forum to make decisions on
enforceability. 220 To cure this systemic problem, he recommended that federal

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975).
See id. at 363, 533 P.2d at 752.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

214. Id.

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 363, 533 P.2d at 752-53.
Ragsdale, supra note 4, at 141.
Id. at 136.
Id.at 141.
Id. at 141-45.
Id. at 149-51.
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courts be permitted to review tribal court determinations on the enforceability of
state court judgments.2 2 '
The Jim case, although it was a choice-of-law case, has led courts in
Washington 222 and Idaho 223 to hold that tribal court judgments must be given full
faith and credit under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 because a tribe is a territory. The case of In
re Adoption ofBuehl comes from the Washington Supreme Court and holds, among
other things, that the child custody order of the Blackfeet tribal court (located
224
within the state of Montana) was entitled to full faith and credit in Washington.
The conclusive effect of the tribal court order prevented a Washington trial court
from considering an adoption petition filed by foster parents who were then living
in Washington and who had temporary custody of the child. 225 The child was a
member of the Blackfeet tribe and had been ordered into the temporary custody of
the foster parents by the Blackfeet tribal court. 226 The Washington Supreme Court
relied on Jim and did not even cite the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S.
Constitution or the enabling legislation of the Clause.227 Because In re Adoption of
Buehl involved a tribal court foster child placement, the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA), passed in 1978,228 would now govern and provide an explicit full faith and
credit rule. 229 For cases not governed by ICWA, the Washington Supreme Court
probably now would defer to the Ninth Circuit's later decision in Wilson (and those
cases following Wilson), which, as we recall, held that neither the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution nor its implementing legislation, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738, applies to tribal court judgments.'
In Sheppard v. Sheppard,23' the Idaho Supreme Court held that a tribal court
adoption proceeding was entitled to full faith and credit in Idaho courts.232 In
reaching this conclusion, the court read section 1738 as bringing tribal courts within
its sweep. 233 The court read "territory" to include Indian tribes and relied on the
1855 Supreme Court case of Mackey v. Cox. 234 The court also relied on the dicta in
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez and the holding in Jim v. CIT FinancialService
Corp.235 The Idaho Supreme Court apparently did not use the full faith and credit
rule contained in ICWA because the adoption took place prior to the enactment of
ICWA. 236 Recognition of the tribal court adoption by the Idaho Supreme occurred
221. Id. at 151.
222. Duckhead v. Anderson (In re Adoption of Buehl), 555 P.2d 1334 (Wash. 1976).
223. Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895 (Idaho 1982).
224. 555 P.2d at 1342 ("Tribal court decrees are entitled to full faith and credit to the same extent as decrees
of sister states.") (citing Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 533 P.2d 751 (N.M. 1975)).
225. See id. at 1343.
226. Id. at 1335-36.
227. See id. at 1342.
228. See Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3071 (1978).
229. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (d) (2000) (providing a full faith and credit rule for tribal court determinations of
child custody under the act).
230. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997).
231. 655 P.2d 895 (Idaho 1982).
232. Id. at 902-03.
233. Id. at 901-02.
234. Id. at 902.
235. Id.
236. See id. at 898 (stating that the adoption occurred in 1971); supra note 227 (stating that adoption
occurred in 1971, and Congress passed ICWA in 1978).
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well after Congress had passed ICWA, but, because the tribal court adoption
occurred well before enactment of ICWA, its effective date rules meant that its full
faith and credit provision did not apply. Now, ICWA's full faith and credit rule
would govern tribal court adoptions of Indian children occurring after its passage.
Regarding the broader question of general full faith and credit, Idaho is within the
Ninth Circuit and, presumably, would follow the decision in Wilson.
Taken together, Wilson, Beuhl, and Sheppardraisean interesting question of how
state courts should respond to federal precedent on a federal question squarely
decided by the federal circuit court in which the states are located. Wilson, as a
technical matter, is not binding precedent for the supreme courts of Washington or
Idaho. This is true because federal review of their decisions can occur only by the
U.S. Supreme Court.237 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit has no direct authority over
these courts. Wilson cited Buehl and indicated its disagreement with its holding but
did not purport to overrule it.238 Presumably, both state courts would reconsider
their decisions and view Wilson as very persuasive authority.
This leaves New Mexico as the only state squarely and unequivocally in the full
faith and credit camp-the camp that believes that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 compels, as a
matter of federal law, a state to recognize tribal court judgments. Interestingly, Jim
was a choice-of-law case and did not even involve enforcement of a tribal court
judgment in a New Mexico court. Nonetheless, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
has extended Jim to tribal court judgments. In Halwood v. Cowboy Auto Sales,
Inc. ,239 similar repossession facts played out as in the Jim case. 24" Nonetheless, Mr.
Halwood, a member of the Navajo Nation, brought suit in tribal court and secured
a money judgment that included punitive damages. 24 ' The defendant asserted that
the tribal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because punitive damages were
criminal in nature and that under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Oliphantv.
Suquamish Indian Tribe the tribal court had no criminal jurisdiction over a nonmember of the tribe.242 The court, however, found that the punitive damages were
civil, and not criminal, in nature. Accordingly, the tribal court had jurisdiction and
its judgment was entitled to full faith and credit under the New Mexico Supreme
Court's decision in Jim v. CIT FinancialService Corp.243 As a result, the court
found that enforcement was proper.
The enduring value of Jim and Halwood is questionable because both came out
before the Ninth Circuit's decision in Wilson. In fact, the Halwood opinion was
released shortly before Wilson,2' and the New Mexico Supreme Court's denial of
the certiorari petition in Halwood occurred the day after the Wilson opinion was
released. We can assume that neither the Court of Appeals nor the New Mexico

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
opinion in
September

28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2004).
See 127 F.3d 805, 808 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997).
1997-NMCA-098, 946 P.2d 1088.
See id. at 1089-90.
See id. at 1089.
See id. at 1090.
Id. at 1090-91.
The Court of Appeals issued its opinion on May 20, 1997. Id. at 1088. The Ninth Circuit issued its
Wilson on September 23, 1997. 127 F.3d at 805. The certiorari petition in Halwood was denied on
24, 1997. 946 P.2d at 1088.
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Supreme Court was aware of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Wilson. Interestingly,
the New Mexico Supreme Court has quite recently cited Halwood with approval245
on the tribal jurisdiction issue but not on the full faith and credit question of
whether a tribe is a territory within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
If Jim and Halwood are correct, however, then a tribal court tax judgment is
entitled to full faith and credit to the same extent as a state court judgment finding
a tax liability. This would make enforcement much easier for tribes. Unfortunately,
New Mexico is the only state still squarely in the full faith and credit camp (as a
matter of federal law). Given the gathering momentum of the Wilson line of cases,
New Mexico may reverse itself some day soon.
C. State Provisionsfor Recognition of Tribal Court Judgments
If Wilson is correct, as I think it is, then, as a matter of federal law, states are not
required to give full faith and credit to tribal court judgments. With no federal law
mandating enforcement, states can enforce tribal court judgments as state law
dictates. Wilson holds that full faith and credit is not required under federal law.246
Wilson also holds that federal courts are required to extend comity to tribal court
determinations.247 The legal standards for applying comity come from federal
common law.248 The comity holding in Wilson does not require states to extend
comity to tribal court judgments. This reminds us that state recognition of tribal
court judgments is still a matter of state, not federal, law.
State treatment, then, can vary from state to state, and we find a fair amount of
variance. On one end, we have New Mexico's case law, which extends full faith and
credit, but only because the New Mexico Supreme Court thinks that federal law
requires it to do so. Maine,249 Oklahoma, 5 0 Nebraska,25' South Dakota,252
Washington, 253 Wisconsin, 254 and Wyoming 255 have their own full faith and credit
or comity statutes that they have adopted and that grant some form of recognition
of tribal court proceedings. Oklahoma, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have broad full

245. See Tempest Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Belone, 2003-NMSC-019,1 16,74 P.3d 67, 72.
246. See 127 F.3d 805, 808-09 (9th Cir. 1997).
247. Id. at 809.
248. Id. at 813.
249. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 702, 706 (West 2003) (providing full faith and credit for arrest
warrants issued by the tribal courts of the Passamaquoddy Tribe or the Penobscot Nation, both tribes located within
Maine).
250. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 728 (2004) (authorizing the state's supreme court to extend full faith and credit
to tribal court judgments).
251. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1504(2), (4) (2003) (providing full faith and credit to tribal court child custody
proceedings and imposing a choice-of-law rule deferring to tribal law).
252. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.240 (2004) (extending full faith and credit to juvenile proceedings of tribal
courts).
253. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-1-25 (Michie 2003) (providing a rule that prohibits the extension of comity
to tribal court proceedings unless one of several conditions are met, including that the tribe in question grants
reciprocal recognition to the judicial proceedings of South Dakota).
254. WIS. STAT. § 806.245 (2003) (granting full faith and credit to tribal court proceedings, including tribes
from outside Wisconsin in some matters).
255. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-1Il1 (Michie 2003) (granting full faith and credit to decisions of the tribes of
the Wind River Reservation unless one of several conditions is not met).
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faith and credit provisions, and each requires reciprocal recognition on the part of
tribes. 6
So, in those three states, a tribe could obtain full faith and credit for its judicial
proceedings, including tribal court tax judgments, by providing tribal court
recognition of state court proceedings. Because the tribal court proceeding will not
receive full faith and credit unless the tribal court, as a matter of tribal law, offers
full faith and credit to the state court proceedings, the effect of this reciprocity
requirement is unclear on three fronts. First, does it mean that a tribe's refusal to
extend reciprocity forecloses the application of comity, which, as a broad common
law doctrine, does not necessarily require reciprocity? Second, will a federal court

256. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 728(B) (2004); WIS. STAT. 806.245(l)(e) (2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-1111 (a)(iv) (Michie 2003). The Wisconsin statute provides:
806.245. Indian tribal documents: full faith and credit.
The judicial records, orders and judgments of an Indian tribal court in Wisconsin and
(1)
acts of an Indian tribal legislative body shall have the same full faith and credit in the
courts of this state as do the acts, records, orders and judgments of any other
governmental entity, if all of the following conditions are met:
The tribe which creates the tribal court and tribal legislative body is organized
(a)
under 25 USC 461 to 479.
(b)
The tribal documents are authenticated under sub. (2)
The tribal court is a court of record.
(c)
The tribal court judgment offered in evidence is a valid judgment.
(d)
(e)
The tribal court certifies that it grants full faith and credit to the judicial records,
orders and judgments of the courts of this state and to the acts of other
governmental entities in this state.
To qualify for admission as evidence in the courts of this state:
(2)
(a)
Copies of acts of a tribal legislative body shall be authenticated by the certificate
of the tribal chairperson and tribal secretary.
(b)
Copies of records, orders and judgments of a tribal court shall be authenticated
by the attestation of the clerk of the court. The seal, if any, of the court shall be
affixed to the attestation.
(3)
In determining whether a tribal court is a court of record, the circuit court shall
determine that:
The court keeps a permanent record of its proceedings.
(a)
Either a transcript or an electronic recording of the proceeding at issue in the
(b)
tribal court is available.
(c)
Final judgments of the court are reviewable by a superior court.
(d)
The court has authority to enforce its own orders through contempt proceedings.
In determining whether a tribal court judgment is a valid judgment, the circuit court on
(4)
its own motion, or on the Motion of a party, may examine the tribal court record to
assure that:
The tribal court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and over the person named
(a)
in the judgment.
(b)
The judgment is final under the laws of the rendering court.
(c)
The judgment is on the merits.
The judgment was procured without fraud, duress or coercion.
(d)
(e)
The judgment was procured in compliance with procedures required by the
rendering court.
The proceedings of the tribal court comply with the Indian civil rights act of
(f)
1968 under 25 USC 1301 to 1341.
No lien or attachment based on a tribal court judgment may be filed, entered in the
(5)
judgment and lien docket or recorded in this state against the real or personal property
of any person unless the judgment has been given full faith and credit by a circuit court
under this section.
(6)
A foreign protection order, as defined in s. 806.247 (1) (b), issued by an Indian tribal
court in this state shall be accorded full faith and credit under s. 806.247.
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in South Dakota (Eighth Circuit), Montana (Ninth Circuit), or Oklahoma (Tenth
Circuit) extend its own federal common law brand of comity if the tribe does not
extend reciprocity? And third, if a tribe does extend reciprocity to state court
judgments, would a federal court apply the state's full faith and credit standard or
its own federal common law standard for comity?
My general criticism of the unilateral state approach is that it adopts a "take-it-orleave-it" approach in which the tribes either take the regime as dictated or they
receive none of its benefits. It would be far better for states and tribes to identify
common ground and decide on recognition of each other's judicial proceedings in
a way that accommodates their mutual needs.257 It might be that tax enforcement is
not an issue for either side, in which case there is no need to craft a rule for a
hypothetical situation. Child protective orders might be the area of maximum
concern, and much might be accomplished by addressing that concern first, seeing
how it works, and then building on an existing relationship to solve future problems
as they arise. Such an approach would definitely further and improve governmentto-government relations. Current federal Indian policy promotes such relationships
between states and tribes as a positive way of solving problems. Too often,
litigation is seen as the way of solving problems. Litigation, however, seldom
provides an overall solution and usually weakens ongoing relations between a tribe
and state.
Even with all of the interest and scholarly commentary, many states have no case
law, no statutes, and no procedural rules that directly address tribal court
proceedings. In these states, it is likely that their courts will approach a tribal court
proceeding in the same way that they approach a proceeding from a foreign court.
That approach would be comity. Minnesota, whose supreme court recently adopted
a procedural rule for the enforcement of tribal court judgments, has endorsed a
comity approach. A specific rule, like Minnesota's rule, is beneficial because it
gives parties a specific set of criteria to determine whether comity should apply. 59
257. For a detailed discussion of this type of approach, see Deloria & Laurence, supra note 13.
258. See Order Promulgating Amendments to the General Rules of Practice for the District Courts, CX-891863 (Minn. Supreme Court Dec. 11, 2003) (adding MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. Rule 10.01 entitled, "When Tribal Court
Orders and Judgments Must Be Given Effect" and Rule 10.02 entitled, "When Recognition of Tribal Court Orders
and Judgments Is Discretionary"). Rule 10.01 adopts full faith and credit only when mandated by federal or state
law and provides a specific procedure for tribal court orders subject to the Violence Against Women Act of 2000
provision contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2003).
259. See id. Rule 10.02, which provides as follows:
(a)
Factors. In cases other than those governed by Rule 10.01(a), enforcement of a tribal
court order or judgment is discretionary with the court. In exercising this discretion, the
court may consider the following factors:
(1)
whether the party against whom the order or judgment will be used has been
given notice and an opportunity to be heard or, in the case of matters properly
considered ex parte, whether the respondent will be given notice and an
opportunity to be heard within a reasonable time;
(2)
whether the order or judgment appears valid on its face and, if possible to
determine, whether it remains in effect;
(3)
whether the tribal court possessed subject-matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction
over the person of the parties;
(4)
whether the issuing tribal court was a court of record;
(5)
whether the order or judgment was obtained by fraud, duress, or coercion;
(6)
whether the order or judgment was obtained through a process that afforded fair
notice, the right to appear and compel attendance of witnesses, and a fair hearing
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A standard is helpful because comity is a common law doctrine that can vary from
state to state in its details. The rule may also help the tribal courts develop a sense
of the judicial standards that the Minnesota courts are expecting the tribal courts to
follow.
D. Special FederalStatutes Requiring Recognition of Tribal CourtJudgments
The discussion thus far has looked at whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the Constitution or its implementing legislation, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires
recognition of tribal court judgments. So far as the Ninth Circuit2 60 is concerned,
comity, not full faith and credit, is the operative judgment recognition methodology
for tribal court judgments. Congress, however, has passed specific legislation
requiring state and federal courts to give full faith and credit to certain tribal court
proceedings.
The most important of these provisions is found in the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA), which requires federal, state, territorial, and tribal recognition of specific
child custody proceedings of a tribe.26 1 As a result, a tribal court's determination
that a mother loses custody of her child must be recognized by federal courts, state
courts, territorial courts, courts within U.S. possessions, and other tribal courts if
the tribal court proceeding is covered by ICWA.262 Other congressionally mandated
and targeted full faith and credit arrangements can be found in the Violence Against
Women Act,2 63 the Child Support Orders Act,2" the Indian Land Consolidation
Act,265 the National Indian Forest Resources Management Act,266 the American

Indian Agricultural
Resources Management Act,2 67 and the Maine Indian Claims
268
Act.
Settlement
As already noted, Congress specifically included tribes in part of the Defense of
Marriage Act. The specific provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C, just down the statutory
road from section 1738 (the full faith and credit enabling statute), affirmatively
rescinds the federal mandate contained in section 1738 that would otherwise require
one state to recognize the same-sex marriage of another state. Congress passed this

before an independent magistrate;
whether the order or judgment contravenes the public policy of this state;
whether the order or judgment is final under the laws and procedures of the
rendering court, unless the order is a non-criminal order for the protection or
apprehension of an adult, juvenile or child, or another type of temporary,
emergency order;
(9)
whether the tribal court reciprocally provides for recognition and implementation
of orders, judgments and decrees of the courts of this state; and
(10)
any other factors the court deems appropriate in the interests of justice.
(b)
Procedure. The court shall hold such hearing, if any, as it deems necessary under the
circumstances.
260. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1997).
261. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (2000).
262. See id.
263. 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2000).
264. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (2000).
265. 25 U.S.C. § 2207 (2000).
266. 25 U.S.C. § 3106 (2000).
267. 25 U.S.C. § 3713 (2000).
268. 25 U.S.C. § 1725(g) (2000).
(7)
(8)
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statute in anticipation of one or more states legalizing same-sex marriage.269 As

things now stand, it looks as though same-sex marriage is legal in Massachusetts
until that state passes a state constitutional amendment forbidding such marriages.27 °
In application, for example, section 1738C relieves Utah from having to recognize
a same-sex marriage from Massachusetts. The point of section 1738C is that Utah
remains free to recognize such a marriage but is not compelled to do so as a matter
of federal law. Section 1738C explicitly applies to Indian tribes, 2 7' and this means
that tribes are relieved of any federal full faith and credit obligation they have to
recognize a same-sex marriage from a state or from another tribe. Contrariwise, a
state under section 1738C is relieved of its federal obligation to recognize a samesex marriage that might be legal under tribal law. Section 1738C certainly implies
that full faith and credit otherwise applies to states and tribes and on a reciprocal
basis. Can congressional intent reflected in a 1996 statute be lifted and transferred
to a related provision whose operative words Congress passed in 1804? One would
not think so, but some courts have done exactly that. 72 For present purposes, we
will ignore section 1738C and leave further elaboration to Professor Clinton.273
Does Congress even have the power to impose a full faith and credit obligation
on tribes and states regarding each other's judgments? Obviously, the source of
congressional power to enact the full faith and credit provisions applicable to tribes
does not come from text found in clause one of article IV of the U.S. Constitution.
The second sentence of that clause provides Congress with the power to prescribe
the procedure and extent to which full faith and credit must be afforded. But that
power extends only to full faith and credit among states. Tribes are not mentioned.
Because almost no one seems to think that tribes are states, the congressional power
to require state courts to recognize tribal court judgments in specified contexts must
be found elsewhere in the Constitution.
Over the years, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued a number of opinions finding
that Congress has plenary power over tribes . 274 The text of the Constitution contains
269. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 3-6, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2907,2907-10 (expressing concern
over possibility that the Full Faith and Credit Clause and its enabling legislation might require other states to
recognize same-sex marriages from Hawaii, where, at the time, the case of Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.
1993), seemed to foretell legalization of same-sex marriages).
270. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the Massachusetts
Constitution requires the state to allow same-sex marriages).
271. This is the text of section 1738C:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give
effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession,
or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage
under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from
such relationship.
272. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1997) (using this very logic to support the
opposite conclusion given specific federal full faith and credit provisions applying to tribes and stating that a "later
legislative act can be regarded as a legislative interpretation of an earlier act and 'is therefore entitled to great
weight in resolving any ambiguities and doubts') (quoting Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 244 (1972)
(quoting United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1940))).
273. See generally Clinton, supra note 14, at 901-07. See also discussion supra text accompanying notes
87-100.
274. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (the power of Congress to enact the Major
Crimes Act and extend its reach to Indian tribes emanates from the plenary power that Congress has over tribes);
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (the plenary power of Congress over tribes enables it to unilaterally
abrogate treaty obligations).
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no explicit authorization to Congress granting it plenary power over Indian tribes.
One case reasoned that plenary power over Indian tribes must exist within Congress
"because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is
within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been
denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes. ' 275 The
cumulative weight of Supreme Court decisions makes it clear that Congress has
plenary power over Indian tribes.276 We might just as well write it with an ink pen
into our own copies of the Constitution. But does plenary power over Indian tribes
give Congress the power to coerce states into recognizing tribal court judgments?
The answer is very most probably "yes." In the aggregate, the interstate commerce
clause, the necessary and proper clause, the Senate's treaty approval power, and the
supremacy clause provide sufficient sources of federal power to require state
27
recognition of tribal court determination in child custody proceedings.
One narrow exception may involve state sovereign immunity. The U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that Congress could not waive a state's sovereign immunity from suit
in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 27 8 which permitted tribes to bring an
279
action in federal court against a state that refused to negotiate a gaming compact.
The court said that the Eleventh Amendment disabled Congress from statutorily
waiving the state's sovereign immunity from suit. 2 0 So, if a state official
affirmatively refused to recognize a tribal court determination on a child custody
matter and if an interested party other than the United States sued, then the official
could claim sovereign immunity and assert that ICWA's full faith and credit
mandate, applied in this way, went beyond the legislative power of Congress. 28 '
Such a scenario is actually possible because state child welfare agencies are often
involved in the foster care of Indian children who in turn might be the subject of a
tribal court child custody determination.

275. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 385.
276. As an aside, my own view is that the U.S. Constitution does not give Congress plenary power over
Indian tribes for two reasons. First, Congress has only those powers granted to it in the text of the Constitution and
the text provides no such power either explicitly or by implication. Second, the governmental powers of the federal
government and of the states come from the people. The "people" of the states, at the time of the Constitution, had
no political power and no dominion over Native American governments and, therefore, had no power or dominion
to transfer to their states or to the federal government. Britain asserted that it acquired political dominion over much
of North America through John Cabot's 1497 discovery. The justification for this discovery giving political
dominion to the British over Native American governments was the British claim to religious and racial superiority
over Native Americans. By twenty-first century moral and legal standards, such a theory is unsupportable and
patently unjust. The only legally and morally acceptable means for Congress to acquire political authority over
Native American governments would be through their consent or through ajust war. Henry Knox, the first Secretary
of War in George Washington's administration, stated the legal norm this way:
The Indians being the prior occupants, possess the right of the soil. It cannot be taken from them
unless by their free consent, or by the right of conquest in case of ajust war. To dispossess them
on any other principle, would be a gross violation of the fundamental laws of nature, and of that
distributive justice which is the glory of a nation.
Rpt. from Henry Knox, Sec. of War, to President George Washington (June 15, 1789) (reprinted in 1 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 13 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1998)).
277. See the full faith and credit provision in the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (d) (2000).
278. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47, 72-73 (1996).
279. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (2000).
280. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-76.
281. See id. at 73-76 (narrowly construing the Ex parte Young doctrine and making this a colorable
argument).
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IV. OFF-RESERVATION ENFORCEMENT OF TRIBAL
COURT TAX JUDGMENTS
Federally recognized Indian tribes, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, have
the power to impose tribal taxes within their political territory.2 82 Although this
power may be severely limited when the taxable activity involves a non-member on
fee land within the political boundary of a tribe, 3 some tribes still have a sufficient
tax base to make tribal taxation a viable option for raising revenue. The Navajo
Nation, for example, has a mature and well-developed tribal tax system that
currently raises about $75,000,000 in tribal tax revenue each year. 284 Not all tribal
taxpayers will want to pay the taxes that they owe. When this happens, offreservation enforcement is an option. Will a tribe be able to enforce its tribal court
tax judgments in state or federal courts?
The question presupposes that the tax liability will take the form of a tribal court
judgment. Collection of a tribal tax through on-reservation enforcement of a tribal
court judgment would actually be quite rare. Most tax systems, 28' including tribal
tax systems, 28 are set up so that an administrative agency can determine a
taxpayer's tax liability and collect it without going through a judicial proceeding.
For the Navajo Nation, for example, this is the Office of the Navajo Tax
Commission. 287 For the United States, it is the Department of the Treasury and the
288
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which is a subsidiary agency of the department.
The IRS, for example, can assess a federal tax and then, after demand of payment
from the taxpayer and a failure to pay the demand, collect the tax without judicial
intervention. 289 To collect a delinquent tax liability, the IRS can simply send the
taxpayer's bank a notice of levy and the bank will send the balance of funds to
IRS. 290 States have similar tax collection machinery. 29' Courts are rarely involved

282. See, e.g., Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905) (validating a tribal permit tax imposed for
the privilege of doing business on the Creek Nation and finding that the power to tax was "one of the inherent and
essential attributes of sovereignty"); Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980) (finding that
a tribe's cigarette tax was proper because the "power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly
involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested
of it by federal law or necessary implication of their dependent status"); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S.
130, 141 (1982) (confirming the tribe's severance tax on natural gas and concluding that the tribe's "authority to
tax non-Indians who conduct business on the reservation does not simply derive from the Tribe's power to exclude
such persons, but is an inherent power necessary to tribal self-government and territorial management"); KerrMcGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985) (validating the Navajo Nation's business activity
tax and possessory interest tax).
283. See Atkinson Trading Post Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 647 (2001).
284. Report of the Office of the Navajo Tax Commission (Fiscal Year 2003) (on file with author).
285. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6331-6343 (2004) (levy provisions that enable IRS to seize a taxpayer's property
for non-payment of delinquent taxes without a court judgment establishing the liability).
286. See, e.g., Office of the Navajo Tax Commission, Uniform Tax Administration Statute, §§ 118-125
(provisions for administrative collection of Navajo Nation taxes), available at http://www.navajotax.org/
uniform-tax-administrationstatue.htm (last visited July 11, 2004).
287. Id. § 103.
288. See I.R.C. §§ 7801, 7803 (2004).
289. See I.R.C. § 6331 (2004) (authorizing a levy).
290. See .R.C. § 6332 (2004) (requiring the person upon whom the levy is served to turn over the taxpayer's
property to the IRS).
291. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, § 7-1-31 (1979) (authorizing seizure of property through administrative levy).
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and become relevant only at certain due process points.292 The vast majority of
coercive tax collections take place without judicial intervention. Non-government
creditors do not have this array of collection tools. True, self-help repossession for
enforcement of security interests in tangible personal property and repossession of
real property following default on a conditional sales contract usually do not require
judicial participation. Creditors have other collection tools as well, such as bad
credit reports and aggressive debt collection personnel. Nonetheless, a gardenvariety, unsecured debt usually requires a suit to prove the debt and liability of the
debtor plus ajudicial enforcement action, such as a writ of garnishment, 293 to effect
collection.
A tribe may very well find itself owed a large tax liability from a taxpayer who
no longer has any connection with the reservation. If the taxpayer and the taxpayer's
assets are located beyond the reach of tribal tax authorities, what options are
available? By comparison, consider a federal tax liability. The IRS has the entire
United States, its possessions, and its territories as the theater of potential tax
collection action. As a result, the IRS has an easier time with collection. Collection
of federal tax liabilities from offshore sources, however, is another matter.294
States are a different matter. As in the case of tribes, collection becomes more
difficult for states when the taxpayer and the taxpayer's assets are located out of
state. A state's police power, as part of its tax collection muscle, ends at its
boundaries. 295 As a result, administrative collection tools are generally ineffective

beyond a state's own boundaries. Moreover, an administrative tax assessment is not
a judgment eligible for full faith and credit. 296 Nonetheless, a state has the option
of reducing its unpaid tax assessment to a judgment by suing the taxpayer in one of
its own courts. The state can then seek full faith and credit in the state in which the
taxpayer has assets. Although this is not a convenient tax collection method, states
may find that it is their only choice when the tax liability is large enough to justify
the time, effort, and expense. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Milwaukee County v.
M.E. White Co., 29 7 has indicated that full faith and credit for sister state tax
judgments is required. Until the decision in Milwaukee County, it was not clear if
tax judgments from sister states were eligible for full faith and credit.
To facilitate cross-border tax collection with sister states, some states have
enacted legislation that gives reciprocal enforcement to sister state tax assessments
that have not been reduced to a judgment.298 So far, this approach is rare. These
292. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6330(d) (2004) (providing judicial review of the notice requirements of the levy
process).
293. For insights on garnishment, especially in a tribal/state context, see Laurence, Off-Reservation
Garnishment,supra note 13.
294. For some interesting discussion of this aspect of tax collection, see Bruce Zagaris, The Procedural
Aspects of U.S. Tax Policy Towards Developing Countries: Too Many Sticks and No Carrots, 35 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 331, 366-83 (2003).
295. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488 (2003) (involving California's attempt to
determine and collect state tax liabilities from an individual in Nevada).
296. See Will of Dow, 390 N.Y.S.2d 721, 731 (App. Ct. 4th Div. 1977) (stating that it "is a recognized
general rule that tax assessments issued by the administrative authorities of other states which are not reduced to
judgment will not be afforded full faith and credit or comity").

297. 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
298. See OR. REV. STAT. § 305.610 (2003) (providing enforcement of sister state tax assessments to the
extent that the particular sister state provides reciprocity).
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relatively rare reciprocal tax enforcement provisions do not apply to tribal court tax
assessments.
We see, then, that the IRS has the easiest time because tribal and state borders
have no meaning in the administrative tax collection process. For states, crossborder administrative tax collection is very limited. Reducing an assessment to a
judgment in a home-state court and then seeking enforcement in a sister state court
through full faith and credit is the only realistic option for most states. Although
states face a difficult time, tribes have it much worse.
As the discussion above shows, full faith and credit for tribal court judgments in
state courts is not a promising option. This author believes that the Ninth Circuit's
line of cases will become the norm before too long and that the issue may be so
straightforward to the federal circuits that we will never get U.S. Supreme Court
review. But perhaps I am wrong. Justice Ransom of the New Mexico Supreme
Court, at the suggestion of P.S. Deloria, has asserted that full faith and credit for
tribal court judgments is a realistic option because some state courts, in accordance
99
with their own case law, afford full faith and credit to tribal court judgments.
Under his theory, a person seeking enforcement can take a tribal court judgment to
a friendly state, receive full faith and credit, and thereby transform the tribal court
judgment into a state court judgment. This state court judgment, as a matter of
3 °0
federal law, is then eligible for full faith and credit under the U.S. Constitution.
Justice Ransom's "transformer" theory has some basic problems. For example,
the taxpayer may have no connections with the friendly state and may have no
assets there. Let's assume that the tribal tax judgment is from the Navajo District
Court and determines a liability of $500,000 against T, the taxpayer. Let's assume
further that T, a non-member of the tribe, has moved away from the Navajo
Nation's reservation and now lives in California. Finally, let's assume that T has
$600,000 in an account in a California bank that has no branches in New Mexico.
The Office of the Navajo Tax Commission (the Office) takes its Navajo Nation tax
judgment to the state district court in Albuquerque, New Mexico. To record the
judgment, the Office must give notice to T. The Office serves T with notice through
a California process server. The Office then takes its New Mexico judgment to
California seeking full faith and credit in a local court. Again, the Office must give
T notice and then seek judicial collection measures. Here, the Office would likely
seek a writ of garnishment on T' s California bank account. Will the California court
recognize the New Mexico judgment? This scenario makes it difficult to establish
that New Mexico has any real opportunity to actually give full faith and credit to the
judgment. I doubt that the process of recordation would be viewed as sufficient to
make the Navajo court tax judgment into a New Mexico money judgment to which
California must give full faith and credit. What we have is a due process problem
299. See Ransom et al., supra note 16, at 267-73.
300. Presumably, the transformer theory would work under any of these circumstances: (1) a state like New
Mexico, under its interpretation of federal law, extends full faith and credit to a tribal court tax judgment and
thereby transforms it into a state judgment entitled to full faith and credit; (2) a state like Wisconsin, as a matter
of its state law, gives full faith and credit to the judgment; or (3) a state like Minnesota or Oklahoma recognizes
that judgment under its state law of comity. If a federal court recognizes the judgment, then no full faith and credit
is needed because it then becomes a federally recognized judgment enforceable around the country through the
federal court system.
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in which the Navajo taxpayer, now living in California, has insufficient contacts
with New Mexico to justify judicial intervention by a New Mexico court.3"'
Under the "transformer" theory, foreign judgments would have to be treated the
same way-once recognized in a state jurisdiction with easy recognition rules, the
"transformed" foreign judgment becomes a state judgment entitled to full faith and
credit around the country. Given that some twenty-nine states have adopted the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (UFMJRA)3 °2 and given that
UFMJRA makes enforcement of foreignjudgments easier than common law comity,
one would expect to see some cases challenging the "transformation" into a state
judgment entitled to full faith and credit under 28 U.S.C. § 1738. I will take the
absence of such cases as an indicator that no lawyers have thought the
"transformer" theory good enough to make the attempt worth the effort.
The "transformer" theory is not promising, but what about the UFMJRA? Is it
possible that tribal court tax judgments would come within its enforcement
provisions? UFMJRA appears to apply to tribes. It applies to judgments from
foreign states.30 3 A "foreign state" is defined as "any governmental unit other than
the United States, or any state, district, commonwealth, territory, insular possession
thereof, or the Panama Canal Zone, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or the
Ryukyu Islands. ' '3' A federally recognized Indian tribe seems to fit this definition
because it does not come within any of the categories that would make it NOT a
foreign government. But, once again, we are back to the possibility that "territory"
includes an Indian tribe. If a tribe is a territory for purposes of UFMJRA, then tribes
would fall outside of its application because a tribe would not be a foreign
government. I have already expressed my opinion, which is that tribes are not U.S.
territories. Nonetheless, it is important to consider the different context that
UFMJRA provides. It is quite clear that the purpose of UFMJRA is to provide a
method for enforcing money judgments from foreign countries.30 5 Given this
purpose, it would seem strange to include tribes within its terms.
If, however, we decide that tribes are foreign governments for purposes of
UFMJRA, then a potentially fatal problem arises. The definition of enforceable
judgments excludes a "judgment for taxes."30 6 This means that a tribal court tax
judgment cannot be enforced under UFMJRA. This provision does not bar
enforcement. It merely means the enforcement is not available under UFMJRA.
Other tribal court judgments may very well come within UFMJRA, but tax
judgments are explicitly not enforceable. And there is no suggestion that the "noenforcement-of-tax-judgments" rule should be changed. So, for tribes seeking tax
judgment enforcement in one of the twenty-nine states that have enacted UFMJRA,
the effort will not be made easier by UFMJRA.

301. Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
302. UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMEws RECOGNITION Acr OF 1962, 13 U.L.A. 39-80 [hereinafter
UFMJRA].
303. Id. § 1.
304. Id. § 1(1).

305. See Kathleen Patchel, Study Report on Possible Amendment of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act (memo to Study Committee on Recognition of Foreign Judgments) 7 (June 25, 2003) (on file with
author).
306. UFMJRA, supra note 302, § 1(2).
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Except for those states with statutory or procedural-rule-based full faith and
credit provisions, tribes have comity as an option. Unfortunately, a common law
rule known as the "revenue rule" states that comity will not be extended to foreign
tax judgments. The exclusion of tax judgments from the application of UFMJRA
no doubt reflects this rule. The "revenue rule" has an august vintage and originates
from an eighteenth century English case by Lord Mansfield 7 and continues as a
recognized rule under American common law.30" The leading American case is Her
Majesty the Queen v. Gilbertson,3" which involved an attempt by British Columbia
to recovery on a judgment for taxes due by various Oregon residents who had
income from logging operations in Canada.3"' The Ninth Circuit ruled that it would
follow the well known "revenue rule," which is an exception to the rule of comity
that normally applies to foreign judgments.3"' The Ninth Circuit reasoned that it is
inappropriate for an American court to further the governmental interest of a foreign
government.3 1 2 This is consistent with the general refusal to extend comity to the
criminal laws of foreign jurisdictions.3 3
In a more recent case, Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Holdings, Inc.," 14 the Second Circuit considered the revenue rule in a more
complicated context. In R.J. Reynolds, Canada brought a Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against an American tobacco company
and alleged that the company conspired to smuggle cigarettes into Canada. 3" The
damages sought included lost tax revenues. 316 It was the lost tax revenues that
caused the federal court to evaluate whether it would entertain a cause of action in
which a foreign country sought indirect enforcement of its tax laws. In the end, and
after an extensive consideration of the issue, the Second Circuit found that the
"revenue rule" did preclude the federal court from hearing the RICO claim. 317 Of
considerable importance to the court was the tax treaty scheme between the United
States and Canada, which included procedures for reciprocal tax enforcement but
not recognition of each other's tax judgments. I
Taken together, Gilbertson and R.J. Reynolds provide ample authority for the
continued application of the "revenue rule" in the context of comity and
enforcement of foreign tax judgments. Nonetheless, Wilson3 9 and Bird,32 ° two of
the Ninth Circuit cases holding that tribal court judgments are entitled to comity but
not full faith and credit, both mention Gilbertson and the "revenue rule." Wilson
suggests that strict application of the comity rules for foreign judgments is
307. See William J. Kovatch, Jr., Recognizing Foreign Tax Judgments: An Argument for the Revocation of
the Revenue Rule, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 265, 267 (2000).

308. See id. at 268.
309. 597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979).
310. Id. at 1161-63.
311. Id. at 1165.
312. Id.

313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

See id. at 1165 n.10.
268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id. at 105-06.
Id.
Id. at 126.
See id. at 119-22.
See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997).
See Bird v. Glacier Elec. Coop., Inc., 255 F.3d 1136, 1152 (9th Cir. 2001).
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inappropriate in the case of tribal courtjudgments and expresses a desire to provide
easier enforcement for them.3"2' The Ninth Circuit's primary concern in Wilson is
with jurisdiction and not with judicial quality.322 The court is willing to assume that
the judicial quality will be sufficient in most cases. In the Bird decision, however,
a greater concern over quality is evident and the court seems more inclined to
extend the "revenue rule" to tribes. 3 23 Admittedly, the Bird court is merely
speculating and does not actually have the specific problem of tribal tax judgments
in mind.
The Wilson line of thinking actually provides the little bit of light in this rather
long and dark tunnel. The Wilson court is ready, willing, and able to develop a
federal common law of comity for tribal court proceedings.324 If this is true, then the
Ninth Circuit should be open to not applying the "revenue rule" to tribal court tax
judgments. Not applying the "revenue rule" to tribal courtjudgments actually makes
a great deal of sense. The United States has little or no interest in enforcing the tax
laws of other countries. But the federal government has a very strong interest in
helping tribes enforce their tax laws. First, there is some reciprocity here. Federal
tax laws reach into Indian Country, 325 and our affable federal tax collection people,
those friends of ours who work for the IRS, expect tribal members to pay their
federal income taxes and the tribes to assist in this where necessary. True, the IRS
does not need a federal court judgment to take into Indian Country to collect an
unpaid income tax, but it may need a tribal government to honor a levy on a tribal
employee's wages. The IRS expects tribal cooperation, so it seems only fair that the
federal courts should be willing to help tribes whose arsenal of off-reservation tax
collection weapons may be zero.
In addition, the federal government has an explicit policy of furthering tribal selfgovernment.326 A government without sources of revenue cannot function very well.
Governments need money to run their programs and perform their functions. Also,
the federal government is a source of some financial support for many tribes. By
helping tribes develop tax systems and collect taxes owed to them, the federal
government is reducing tribal financial reliance on federal funding. This is quite
different from being the collection agency for Revenue Canada. In the case of
tribes, the federal government has a clear domestic reason for assisting tribes in
collecting their tax revenues. In the case of a foreign government, the approach of
the United States and other countries is "each country for itself."
Another important reason why federal courts should assist tribes in the collection
of tribal tax judgments is the current role these federal courts have in reviewing
jurisdictional limits of tribal taxation. It seems rather strange that a federal court can
validate or invalidate the assertion of a tribal tax but then play no role in its
collection when its own determination affirms the taxpayer's legal liability to the
321. See Wilson, 127 F.3d at 810-13.
322. See id. at 812-13 (but also mentioning due process as a concern relating to the quality of the justice).
323. See Bird, 255 F.3d atl 152.
324. See Wilson, 127 F.3d at 813.
325. See Squire v. Capoemen, 351 U.S. 1 (1956) (in the absence of a treaty or statutory exemption, federal
tax laws apply to Native Americans).
326. Robert J. Miller, Exercising CulturalSelf-Determination: The Makah Indian Tribe Goes Whaling, 25
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 165, 217-18 (2000/2001).
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tribe. It is the exertion of federal judicial power that often diminishes a tribe's
power to tax.327 Therefore, it is appropriate that federal courts determine the extent
of that diminishment. Likewise, it is appropriate that federal courts should have a
role in off-reservation enforcement because the current full faith and credit
mechanism available to states is not available to tribes.
If the Ninth Circuit (and other circuits) is willing to follow the inclination of the
Wilson... court to develop a federal common law that extends more robust comity
to tribal judicial proceedings, then existing federal statutes are available to go the
final collection mile. These provisions enable the filing of liens and seizure of
property for purposes ofjudicial sales.3 29 And, quite importantly, federal judgments
can be executed anywhere within the political jurisdiction of the United States
through a registration process.33 °
Federal judicial participation in the collection of tribal court judgments is
consistent with the early Eighth Circuit case of Buster v. Wright,33' which the
Supreme Court cited with approval in Montana.332 Although the federal court in
Buster did not actually provide the judicial process for the collection of the unpaid
tax, it did uphold the use of the federal police powers to enforce the tribal court's
order to shut down the taxpayer's business for the non-payment of the tribe's tax.
Federal court assistance in tribal tax collection in egregious cases would certainly
help tribes with their tax compliance efforts. Taxpayers who knew that tribes could
use federal judicial enforcement to collect tribal taxes would not evade them with
the hope that tribes would view off-reservation collection as futile.
327. See, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (invalidating a tribal hotel occupancy
tax imposed by the Navajo Nation, although the Navajo Nation argued that it was designed to fund essential
governmental functions, including police, fire, and emergency medical services for the hotel owner and the hotel
guests because the land, although within the Navajo Nation, was fee land owned, not by the tribe, but by the
taxpayer).
328. See 127 F.3d at 813 (indicating that federal courts should develop their own common law of comity for
the enforcement of tribal court judgments).
329. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000) (providing interest on judgments); id. § 1962 (2000) (permitting a lien
against ajudgment debtor's property); id. § 2001 (2000) (allowing judicial sale of real property); id. § 2004 (2000)
(allowing judicial sale of personal property).
330. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (2000). This statute provides:
A judgment in an action for the recovery of money or property entered in any court of appeals,
district court, bankruptcy court, or in the Court of International Trade may be registered by
filing a certified copy of the judgment in any other district or, with respect to the Court of
International Trade, in any judicial district, when the judgment has become final by appeal or
expiration of the time for appeal or when ordered by the court that entered the judgment for
good cause shown. Such a judgment entered in favor of the United States may be so registered
any time after judgment is entered. A judgment so registered shall have the same effect as a
judgment of the district court of the district where registered and may be enforced in like
manner.
A certified copy of the satisfaction of any judgment in whole or in part may be registered in like
manner in any district in which the judgment is a lien.
The procedure prescribed under this section is in addition to other procedures provided by law
for the enforcement of judgments.
Assuming the above provision would apply to a tribal court tax judgment given comity by a federal district court,
then the collection job for tribal tax officials would be much easier. This facilitation of collection is appropriate
because "the purpose of the registration of judgments procedure [under 28 U.S.C. § 1963] is to simplify and
facilitate collection on valid judgments." Coleman v. Patterson, 57 F.R.D. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
331. 135 F. 947, 954-55 (8th Cir. 1905) (endorsing federal court participation in the enforcement of tribal
taxes).
332. See 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
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If states attempt to use federal courts to enforce their tax judgments against tribes
under a comity theory, what would be the result? Ironically, a tribe enjoys sovereign
immunity. 333 In addition, a state attempting to enforce its own tax judgment can find
no federal statute that confers jurisdiction on the federal court.334 In contrast, a tribe
seeking enforcement can establish federal jurisdiction because the underlying claim
is a claim brought by a tribe and arising out of federal law.335 A state seeking
enforcement must then go to the tribal court, and the tribal court then recognizes the
state court tax judgment to the extent required by tribal law. Some tribes have full
faith and credit rules that require enforcement of the judgment if the state provides
reciprocal enforcement.336 Other tribes, like most of the states, have no explicit
foreign judgment enforcement rules. 337 These tribes, then, can develop their own
laws that are best suited to further the tribal interests as defined by the tribe in the
exercise of its sovereignty. A tribe's decision may mean comity, full faith and
credit, no enforcement, or some other approach.
In many cases, negotiations between tribes and states will be beneficial to
determine what tax enforcement arrangement might be mutually beneficial. The
Navajo Tax Commission has developed a good relationship with the Arizona
Department of Revenue. This has led to a fuel tax agreement designed to help both
338
governments achieve maximum compliance with their fuel excise tax programs.
The agreement contemplates information sharing and joint audits of taxpayers.339
The agreement does not provide for reciprocal tax collection, but joint audits are
very close to such an arrangement. 340 Because Arizona had an existing fuel excise
tax program, its department of revenue provided training to staff of the Office of the
Navajo Tax Commission. 31 Although the relationship between the tax authorities
of these two governments has not always been the most cooperative,342 the inter-

333. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509-11 (1991).
334. In the case of a tribe seeking enforcement of one of its tribal court tax judgments, federal jurisdiction
can be found in 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (2000). Section 1362 provides federal jurisdiction when a tribe is a party and
the matter arises under a treaty, the Constitution, or federal law. The Ninth Circuit, in Wilson v. Marchington, 127
F.3d 805, 813 (9th Cir. 1997), has already indicated that comity for tribal court judgments is a matter of federal
common law because of the explicit federal interest in the matter. Therefore, a judgment enforcement action
brought by a tribe in federal court should arise under federal law. No statute comparable to section 1362 applies
to states seeking enforcement of their tax judgments in federal court. The only possible basis would be federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). There should be no federal jurisdiction under section 133 1,
however, because the liability of the tribe will already have been determined as a matter of state law with no federal
law limiting taxation. If there were a federal law limiting the state's power to tax, then there would be no liability
and no basis for collection of the tax.
335. See 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (2000).
336. See, e.g., 24 MILLELACS BAND STAT. ANN. § 2009 (1996) (granting full faith and credit to tribal, state,
and federal judicial proceedings that grant full faith and credit to the tribe's Court of Central Jurisdiction); 2
JICARILLA APACHETRIBAL CODE, ch. 6, § 9 (1987) (granting full faith and credit conditional on the Tribal Council
entering into an implementation agreement with the appropriate tribal, state, and federal governmental authorities).
337. A search of the tribal codes of the Navajo and Cherokee Nations found no provisions dealing with
recognition of judicial proceedings from other jurisdictions.
338. Inter-governmental Agreement between Arizona Department of Revenue and the Office of the Navajo
Tax Commission regarding Fuel Excise Taxes, June 2002 (on file with author).
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Interview with Amy Alderman, Staff Attorney, Office of Navajo Tax Commission, Window Rock,
Navajo Nation, Mar. 9, 2004.
342. Id.
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governmental agreement on the fuel tax shows that cooperation can help the
revenue systems of both governments.
34 3
The tax agreement between the State of Michigan and the Hannahville Tribe
is a good example of dealing with collection questions. The agreement provides
detailed rules about how Michigan tax officials must approach tax collection
activity within the Tribe's jurisdiction. In general, the agreement requires prior
tribal court approval of most audit and collection activity taking place within the
reservation and involving the Tribe or its members."
These two examples show that inter-governmental agreements can take various
forms and meet particularized needs of the tribe and the state. Negotiation of these
agreements can be beneficial to both sides. Generally, such benefits are hard to
achieve when a one-size-fits-all solution is imposed. Inter-governmental agreements
allow for customization.
CONCLUSION
Full faith and credit involving tribal court proceedings is an issue that began well
over 150 years ago and will likely continue for another 150 years. If the last 500
years is any kind of guide, tribes as communities of people exercising some degree
of autonomy are very likely to be around in 2150. I, along with others, do not think
that there is (or should be) a federal mandate forcing blanket reciprocal enforcement
of tribal and state judicial proceedings.
If we use the federal comity approach for enforcement of tribal tax judgments
(along with otherjudicial proceedings of tribes), then case law will take a good long
while to develop, and where it will end up is anyone's guess. Nonetheless, the case
law will be able to respond to specific cases and develop a body of federal common
law that one can hope will validate tribal sovereignty. At some point, the pendulum,
lest it break, will have to swing in favor of tribal sovereignty. The last twenty years
have seen a steady erosion of tribal sovereignty at the hands of the U.S. Supreme
Court. Perhaps the case law will find a balance amongst competing tribal, federal,
and state interests.
Meanwhile, it is in the mutual interest of tribes and states to negotiate their tax
relationships. If tribes and states cannot negotiate the terms of enforceability of their
tax judgments, then the Wilson line of cases provides tribes with a promising
mechanism for securing enforcement. A substantial amount of litigation will be
necessary to establish that federal courts should enforce tribal court tax judgments
outside the reservation. Thus far, we have no federal cases extending Wilson into
the area of enforcing tribal court tax judgments. Further litigation will be necessary
to extend Wilson in circuits outside the Ninth Circuit. If a conflict in the circuits
arises, then Supreme Court resolution would be necessary.
When tribal-state relations grow out of litigation, they do not work very well.
Likewise, a tax system that requires a court case for the payment of every individual
tax liability is a tax system that is broken. Accordingly, tribes and states must

343. Tax Agreement between the Hannahville Indian Community and the State of Michigan (Dec. 20, 2002),
available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/HannahvilleAgreement

344. See id. at 35.

58669-7.pdf.
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cooperate. And if they develop good working relationships, those same relationships
can serve as a basis for solving other problems. By promoting a working
government-to-government relationship, tribes and states can promote the efficient
operation of their tax systems. The tribal-state tax agreements mentioned in this
article are good examples of how tax enforcement issues can be solved through
negotiation.

